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ABSTRACT: This project reveals the unrecognized power of gender and sexuality 
norms in the deep discourse of pivotal American case law on design patents. In Part 1, 
I show that late nineteenth-century cultural developments in the urban Northeast gave 
rise to a stigma surrounding the "ornamental" and "decorative" works under the then-
exclusive legal purview of design-patent protection. Among the politically dominant 
segments of American society, the creation, appreciation, and consumption of design 
"for its own sake" grew increasingly intertwined with notions of frivolity, effeminacy, 
and sexual "deviance." In Part 2, I will examine influential design-patent decisions 
from the l870s through the 1930s against this cultural backdrop. My close reading of 
these decisions will demonstrate that federal judges, particularly in leading cases de-
cided by the Second Circuit, increasingly used design-patent disputes as a vehicle for 
the performance and endorsement of prevailing gender norms. The resulting doctrine 
relegated design patents to near-total irrelevance as a viable form of intellectual prop-
erty protection for a large and crucial portion of the twentieth century. 
CITATION: Charles E. Colman, Design and Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric as 
Metric-Part 1, 55 Jurimetrics J. 419-462 (2015). 
The most you can say of the long skirt is, it conceals ugly feet, crooked legs, 
and awkward attitudes. But we look upon these things as diseases, unnatural 
conditions. It is the violation of some law that makes people crooked and 
ugly, and some false state of mind that makes them awkward. 
-Elizabeth Cady Stanton 1 
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1. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The New Dress, 4 LILY, Apr. 1852, at 27. 
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The "design patent" should, by any traditional measure, be a staple of the 
American IP regime. Yet it has long been dismissed as a trivial anomaly-as 
(to invoke one attorney's recent, fraught characterization) "the red-headed 
stepchild of the intellectual property world."2 Created by Congress at a time 
when the appearance of consumer goods was rapidly gaining in importance, 
design-patent protection provided for exclusive rights in "any new and original 
shape or configuration of any article of manufacture,,3 -rights different from, 
and complementary to, those available for "useful inventions" through so-
called "utility" patents. 4 Just a few decades after the birth of design patents, 
however, their power in litigation was eviscerated through disparaging judicial 
rhetoric, doctrinal distortions, and increasingly frequent findings of invalidity. 
As a result, design patents languished in obscurity for decades, to be rescued 
from oblivion only in recent years. s 
On a superficial level, the marginalization of design patents can be largely 
traced to decisions of the Second Circuit between 1900 and 1930.6 To date, 
however, no one has provided a satisfactory account about why the influential 
2. Clare O'Connor, Fashion's "Apple vs. Samsung": Spanx Patent War Could Change How 
Brands Fight Copycats, FORBES.COM (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/ 
2013/04/1 O/fashions-apple-vs-samsung-spanx -patent-war -could-change-how-brands-fight -copycats/ 
(quoting practitioner). This expression, with its own biases, will have to be addressed on another 
occasion. 
3. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543, 543-44 (1842). 
4. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 332 (2003). Accord Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The 
Origins of American Design Patent Protection, 88 IND. L. J. 837, 838 (2013) ("What differentiates 
these suits is that they involve patents on designs-that is, patents on a product's visual appear-
ance, [as opposed to] the inventive components that make it work."). 
5. See Du Mont & Janis, supra note 4, at 842 n.26 (discussing the "design patent renais-
sance" over the past decade). Of course, it is not possible to pinpoint a single moment at which 
design patents became an effective nullity in litigation. As discussed below, most designers had 
likely come to view design patents as an unpromising vehicle for the assertion of rights in litiga-
tion at least a decade before the beginning of the Second Circuit's 33-year refusal to uphold the 
validity of any challenged design patent. At the same time, design patents had regained some of 
their power even as informed commentators continued to characterize them as "meaningless." See 
Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandberg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1,47 n.234 (2013) (noting Ralph Brown's 1987 characterization of design patents 
as "meaningless" and remarking that by the 201Os, "[t]imes have obviously changed") (citing 
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1987». It warrants 
mention that the "irrelevance" and "meaninglessness" of design patents discussed by McKenna 
and Strandberg, and (for the most part) in this article, is limited to the litigation context. I do not 
address, for example, the procurement or licensing of design patents during the period under ex-
amination. Nor do I take any position on the (extra-doctrinal) repercussions of judicial invalidation 
of design patents-either on the quality or quantity output of designers, see id. at 48, or on the 
perpetuation of social norms via judicial endorsement. Such issues are secondary to this article's 
primary objective: to shed light on uurecognized, and perhaps surprising, reasons for federal 
judges' early evisceration of design-patent protection in the early twentieth century. 
6. The key role of the Second Circuit (and thus my focus on its decisions over those of other 
courts) is explained below. In brief, the court's leading role in design-patent jurisprudence in the 
early 1900s resulted in large part from its location in the U.S. design capital and the Supreme 
Court's refusal to grant certiorari in a case squarely posing an issue of design-patent law after 
1893. See discussion Charles E. Colman, Design and Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric as 
Metric-Part 2,56 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (forthcoming Fall 2015) [hereinafter Colman, Part 2]. 
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American appellate-court judges presiding over pivotal disputes concerning 
design patents relegated them to a multi-decade-long period of near-total irrel-
evance in litigation. 7 With this project, I seek to provide a historically, so-
cially, and cognitively grounded explanation of why design patents were left 
out in the cold of the American intellectual property landscape for so many 
years. 
This article argues, in brief, that turn-of-the-century federal appellate 
courts used design-patent cases as a way to implement, or "perform," shifting 
norms and values implicating sex, morality, and ornament, marginalizing de-
sign patents in the process. Destabilizing phenomena in nineteenth-century 
American society, including women's newly visible assertions of agency in 
the public sphere, the scientific "discovery" of homosexuality, and the outing 
of high-profile design advocates as sexual "deviants," conspired to produce a 
powerful stigma surrounding design in the minds of politically dominant popu-
lations in large cities on the American East Coast. 
Such associations indelibly impacted not only perceptions of design-
especially among men-but also the main body of law governing exclusive 
rights available therein: design patent law. Early twentieth-century federal 
judges effectively used their decisions in design-patent disputes as a vehicle 
for the endorsement and implementation of sociocultural norms,8 distancing 
themselves from design in various ways. In doing so, these judges steered 
design-patent law away from its original legislative purpose, "the progress of 
the decorative arts" -a policy that, by the turn of the twentieth century, stood 
in tension with mainstream normative notions of American masculinity. The 
decisions in question had the cumulative effect of rendering design patents 
moot in federal-court litigation by 1930, which, in turn, produced distortions in 
other areas of American IP law. 9 
7. The only other in-depth scholarly treatment of this topic of which I am aware is Jason J. 
Dn Mont's A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent Standard, 45 
GONZAGA L. REv. 531, 532 (2010) (arguing that "desigu patent protection has witnessed dramatic 
pendulum swings between under and overprotection with more frequency than any other area of 
intellectual property law" because of courts "blindly forcing or tweaking substantive and proce-
dural laws from the utility patent context to fit the peculiar nature of desigus"); id. at 535 (con-
tending that desigu patent's idiosyncratic trajectory resulted from utility patent's "nonobviousness 
requirement [being] forced on design patents through an odd series of administrative, legislative, 
and judicial mishaps"). While Du Mont's work is illuminating in certain respects, I must depart 
from his analysis and conclusions for the reasons identified below. 
8. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 4 (2006) CAs a kind of cate-
gorizing imperative, cultural concepts traverse the numerous domains of our lives--economic, 
kinship, political, legal-binding them to one another .... Features that may not seem to be 
linked are [in fact] crucially related to one another: Our ideas of time inform our understanding of 
kinship and contract, our concepts of causation are entwined with the categories of persons we 
encounter, [and] the ways we imagine our bodies and our interior states affect the powers we 
ascribe to the state .... "); LAW, SOCIETY, AND HISTORY 3 (Robert w. Gordon & Morton J. 
Horwitz eds., 2011) ("[L]aw has little autonomy .... Law cannot consistently or for long periods 
remain out of sync with the interests of the powerful in society. The historian or social scientists 
looking for explanations of legal change will most likely find them in the study of social interests, 
forces, and demands-not in the doctrines, principles, or internal structures of the legal system."). 
9. See Charles E. Colman, The History and Principles of American Copyright Protection for 
Fashion Design: A Strange Centennial, 6 HARv. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 224 (2015) (noting that 
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Of course, the suggestion that historical contexts and social norms influence 
the way judges think and adjudicate disputes is not new; 10 indeed, the proposi-
tion has found substantial empirical support. 11 Yet most legal scholars who 
have set out to reveal the political views, conceptual frameworks, and social 
norms undergirding and influencing rulings and doctrine have completely ig-
nored patent law12 -and, in particular, design-patent law. To date, only a sin-
gle scholar, Jason Du Mont, has tried to explain the multi-decade-Iong ob-
solescence of design patents, 13 but his analysis does not take into account the 
timing of judicial marginalization of design-patent protection and emergence of "separability" 
principle in copyright jurisprudence is unlikely to be a coincidence). Over the past few decades, 
design patents have risen from the ashes, yet they remain decidedly marginalized. See DAN 
HUNTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ll8 (2012) (containing only one paragraph, in a 228-page 
book, specifically addressing design patents); Paul J. Sutton, The Underappreciated Design 
Patent, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Feb. 16,2015), http://www.worldipreview.comlcontributed-
article/the-underappreciated-design-patent ("[Flar too little attention is afforded to the US design 
patent."). 
10. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in THE RULE OF 
LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987); Adam Samaha, 
On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 GEO. L.J. 97, 109-10 (2014) CA recognizable labelfor this 
perspective is 'law and society.' It moves our attention further upstream by adding antecedent 
processes distinguishable from legal institutions but that influence their work, such as the roles of 
organized interests and popular opinion; it also moves our attention further downstream by adding 
the effects of legal institutions on nonlegal actors, such as how people react to rules and results 
delivered by officials."). 
11. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 15-16 (2006) (presenting findings "highly supportive" of "what is prob-
ably the most influential method for explaining judicial voting: the 'attitudinal model,'" which 
posits that 'Judges have certain 'attitudes' toward areas of the law, and these attitudes are good 
predictors of judicial votes in difficult cases"); LEE EpSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 8 (2013) (amassing statis-
tics that "support the realist understanding" that both Supreme Court Justices and circuit -court 
judges often "fall back on their priors-which often have an ideological component" to reach 
rulings). 
12. Fortunately, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Kara W. Swanson, Getting a Grip on the 
Corset: Gender, Sexuality, and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, ll5 (20ll) ('''What 
might a gendered patent or gendered patent system look like?' It looks like the patent system we 
have .... [Platent law, like other areas of law explored through a feminist lens, is not a realm set 
apart, but is part of the gendered society in which inventors, examiners, judges, attorneys, and 
witnesses all live and act."); see also Dan Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, 
SOCIAL POL'y & L., 910 (20ll); Laura Foster, Situating Feminisrns, Patent Law, and the Public 
Domain, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L., 261 (2011); Malia Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of 
the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and 
Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 603 (2006); Shlomit Yavinsky-
Ravid, Eligible Subject Matter-Gender Analysis of Patent Law: International and Comparative 
Perspectives, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'y & L. 851 (2011). 
Professor Kara Swanson has compiled an invaluable bibliography of scholarly works on 
intellectual property law and gender, many first presented at American University Washington 
College of Law's annual IP IGender: Mapping the Connections symposium, where the manuscript 
of this article was first distributed. See IP/Gender-Mapping the Connections, AM. U. WASH. C. 
L., http://www.pijip.org/ip-genderl (last visited Aug. 10,2015). 
13. See generally Du Mont, supra note 7. Du Mont's account of design patent's trajectory 
provides useful data points, but it would be a mistake to assume that policymakers' particular 
methods of plotting and connecting those data points are mere "mishaps." Where it appears there 
is not a rational order in actors' application of "rnles," we can-and should-look more closely. 
See Mary Douglas, A History of Grid and Group Cultural Theory, Workshop on Complexity and 
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powerful cultural associations with design that occupied a central place in the 
social and cognitive landscape against which judges issued their rulings. 14 
This project exposes the heretofore unrecognized influence of design's 
moral and sexual semiotics 15 in foundational decisions on design patents is-
sued by turn-of-the-century courts. Following this introduction, I proceed, in 
Part 1 of a two-article series, to examine the historical, cultural, and cognitive 
dynamics shaping popular thinking about "design" (and particularly, design 
taking the form of "ornament" and "decoration") among the politically domi-
nant segments of American society over the course of the nineteenth century. 
In Part 2, I will engage in a close reading of influential decisions from a piv-
otal period in design-patent history, which collectively reveal the footprint of 
the powerful confluence of events, ideas, personalities and objects explored in 
Part 1.16 The decisions under examination, particularly a series of Second Cir-
Cultural Theory in Honour of Michael Thompson 9-10 (June 27, 2005), http://projects.chass.u 
toronto.calsemiotics/cyberldouglas1.pdf (,,[Actors sometimes] seem to be behaving irrationally .... 
[Such] intransigence is neither irrational nor immoral. It expresses their loyalties and moral princi-
ples, and their responsibilities to other members of their society."). Indeed, this article scrutinizes 
pivotal judicial decisions for a deeper rationality grounded in powerful social norms conceruing 
gender, sexuality, order, morality, and oruament. See discussion Victoria de Grazia, Introduction, 
in THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER AND CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 9 (Victoria 
de Grazia ed., 1996) (noting that laws "define appropriate standards of consumption" and that "the 
state is central to the activity of gendering consumption"). 
14. Du Mont is far from alone in focusing primarily on the doctrinal and the economic. See, 
e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 698 (2001) (noting "consensus among those studying the American patent 
system [in their] focus on utilitarian approaches"); accord Madhavi Sunder, IP, 59 STAN. L. REv. 
257, 257 (2006) ("Unlike its cousins property law and the First Amendment, which bear the 
weight of values such as autonomy, culture, equality, and democracy, in the United States intellec-
tual property is understood almost exclusively as being about incentives. To put it bluntly, [under 
conventional scholarly wisdom,] there are no 'giant-sized' intellectual property values.") But see 
Larry Owens, Patents, the "Frontiers" of American Invention, and the Monopoly Committee of 
1939: Anatomy of a Discourse, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 1076, 1077-78 (1991) ("[I]nvoking, as they 
do, fundamental beliefs about progress and invention, patent systems ... rest on more than eco-
nomic calculation. Patents can be cultural icons as well as commercial tokens."); Maurizio Vitta, 
The Meaning of Design, in DESIGN DISCOURSE: HISTORY, THEORY, CRITICISM 31, 36 (Victor 
Margolin ed., 1989) ("[E]ach cultural system indeed puts itself into a dialectical relationship with 
the society that has expressed it; design is no exception to the rule."). 
15. My previous work has noted the lack of nuanced scholarly and judicial engagement with 
the complexities of design, and fashion design, in particular. See Charles E. Colman, Trademark 
Law and the Prickly Ambivalence of Post-Parodies, 163 U. PA. L. REv. ONLINE 11, 27 (2014), 
http://www.pennlawreview.comlonline/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-ll.pdf ("multidimensional ac-
counts of fashion are almost entirely absent from (the decidedly sparse) legal scholarship and (the 
more voluminous, but often dismissive) case law on the subject in the United States"); Charles E. 
Colman, "A Female Thing": Fashion, Sexism, and the United States Federal Judiciary, 4 VESTOJ: 
J. SARTORIAL MATTERS 53, 58-60 (2013) ("[I]t seems that fashion's inferior status as 'a female 
thing' continues to haunt its treatment in litigation, with inevitable, if unquantifiable, effects on the 
outcome of disputes of great consequence for the parties-and by extension, for the evolution of 
US law more generally."). 
16. This project arguably shares certain key features with the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who 
mined anthropology, sociology, and linguistics to shed light on "the play of symbolic violence, or 
'misrecognition' and 'recognition' of lingnistic-communicative resources [by focusing not on] 
their 'lingnistic' features but [on] the sociohistoricalload they carry within a given social field." 
Jan Blommaert, Pierre Bourdieu: Perspectives on Language in Society, in HANDBOOK OF 
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cuit rulings in the 1910s and 1920s, had the cumulative effect of marginalizing 
design patents as a viable form of IP protection for decades to come. 
This is an empirical argument,17 which requires drawing on the findings of 
cognitive scientists, linguists, anthropologists, and other scholars outside of 
traditional institutional lines drawn around "law." 18 Their work has yielded 
valuable insights into the way people (including judges) reason. Foremost 
among those insights, for present purposes, are the following principles: 
(1) People do not always say precisely what they mean; further, reasoning oc-
curs on both conscious and subconscious levels. 19 As a result, the text of le-
gal decisions cannot be taken at face value;20 judges, like everyone else, often 
reveal their reasoning both intentionally and inadvertently. 21 
PRAGMATICS 6 (Jan-Ola Ostman & Jef Verschueren eds., 2015). The project is also somewhat 
similar in spirit to more recent scholarly endeavors in "cognitive sociology." See EVIATAR 
ZERUBAVEL, SOCIAL MINDSCAPES: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SOCIOLOGY 65 (1997) Cthe 
lines we envision separating one 'thing' from another are not as natural as they may seem, despite 
our tendency to break up the world into sharply delineated islands of meaning"); Wayne H. 
Brekhus et aI., On the Contributions of Cognitive Sociology to the Sociological Study of Race, 4 
SOC. COMPASS 61, 62 (2010). Additionally, this project sits at the intersection of law and visual 
culture studies. See DAVID MORGAN, THE SACRED GAZE: RELIGIOUS AND VISUAL CULTURE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (2005) CPut succinctly, the study of visual culture consists of asking 
how images as well as the rituals, epistemologies, tastes, sensibilities, and cognitive frameworks 
that inform visual experience help construct the worlds people live in and care about."). See also 
id. at 29 CThe study of visual culture concentrates on the cultural work that images do in 
constructing and maintaining (as well as challenging, destroying, and replacing) a sense of order in 
a particular place and time."). For an early example of intellectual-property law scholarship 
sounding in anthropology, cognitive sociology, and visual culture studies, see Rosemary J. 
Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic 
Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1853 (1991). 
17. Though some have suggested otherwise, the quantitative is not exhaustive of the empir-
ical. There are many useful metrics for determining the motivations of legal actors apart from the 
statistical analysis of case outcomes. While the "case-coding" method of analyzing judicial be-
havior can yield valuable insights, see, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor 
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1581 (2006), it sometimes fails to tell the 
whole story. That risk is particularly acute where, as here, (1) the body of relevant case law is 
relatively small, and (2) and a complex diachronic relationship exists between the rhetoric used by 
courts and the formal dispositions of the cases at issue. 
18. See David Cohen & Allan C. Hutchinson, Of Persons and Property: The Politics of 
Legal Taxonomy, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 20, 20 (1990) CTo talk of law without politics or history is 
nonsensical. All lawyers must concede that what they do takes place in historical circumstances 
and has political consequences .... To understand fully the operation of law, it is necessary to 
come to grips with turbulent questions of metaphysics, ethics, sociology and ideology."). 
19. See Robyn Carston, Linguistic Meaning, Communicated Meaning and Cognitive 
Pragmatics, 17 MIND & LANGUAGE 127, 133 (2002) C[Tlhe unconscious inferential processes 
internal to the modular mental systems, which mediate input and output representations, are very 
likely to be quite distinct from the conscious, normative rationalisations of personal-level thinking 
.... [Llinguistically decoded information is usually very incomplete and that pragmatic inference 
plays an essential role in the derivation of the proposition explicitly communicated."). 
20. See Robert W. Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories Revisited": A Response, 37 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 200, 210 n.3 (2012) (highlighting "the unreliability of legal sources as guides to 
social life") (internal citations omitted). 
21. The degree of explicit engagement varies greatly. See Carston, supra note 19, at 134 
nIlmplicatures are wholly external to, and distinct from, the linguistic meaning [of al proposition 
explicitly communicated .... "). 
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(2) Part of that reasoning occurs on a subconscious level, and is grounded in 
the values and biases of the communities of which one is (and wishes to re-
main) a member.22 
(3) These values and biases are conceptually organized through "structuring 
principles" like categorization and "metaphoric" and "metonymic" map-
pings?3 though which ideas originating in one domain of human experience 
are transferred to other domains.24 When cross-domain experiences crystal-
lize into a set of common associations, I describe the resulting cognitive con-
struct as a "connotative cluster." 
(4) Because "linguistic categories have the same character as other concep-
tual categories,,,25 people's words and phrasing provides a window into the 
mechanics and substance of the deep discoursi6 undergirding explicit rea-
. 27 
somng. 
22. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 8, at 7 ("[L]aw is so inextricably entwined in culture that, 
for all its specialized capabilities, it may, indeed, best be seen not simply as a mechanism for 
attending to disputes or enforcing decisions, not solely as articulated rules or as evidence of differ-
ential power, and not even as the reification of personal values or superordinate beliefs, but as a 
framework for ordered relationships, an orderliness that is itself dependent on its attachment to all 
the other realms of its adherents' lives."). 
23. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES 
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 68 et seq. (1987); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: 
LIFE, LAW, AND MIND 4-6 (2001) CIt is the essence of our [traditional] concept of law that it 
operates as an external constraint, much like the impenetrable vegetation of [a] forest. Yet this 
very conception already places law in the domain of metaphor and imagination, which is to say in 
the internal realm of the human mind .... [Because of recent discoveries, however,] it is now 
possible to describe the structures of imagination. These mechanisms ... include mental opera-
tions such as basic-level categorization, conceptual metaphor, metonymy, image-schemas, ideal-
ized cognitive models, and radical categories .... Together, they transform our understanding of 
reasoning and categorization."). 
24. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LNE By 246 (The Univ. of 
Chic. Press ed., rev. ed. 2003) CDo we systematically use inference patterns from one conceptual 
domain to reason about another conceptual domain? The empirically established answer is 'yes.' 
We call that phenomenon conceptual metaphor, and we call the systematic correspondence across 
such domains metaphorical mappings."). 
25. LAKOFF, supra note 23, at 67. See also id. at 69 CIn general, any element of a cognitive 
model can correspond to a conceptual category .... Each schema is a network of nodes and links. 
Every node [mirrors] a conceptual category."). 
26. The term "deep discourse" has idiosyncratic meanings in other disciplines; I do not 
allude to these concepts unless noted otherwise. In general, I use the term to refer to the patterns of 
subconscious reasoning that tracks the habitus of a set of social actors. See Blommaert, supra note 
16, at 9 CA concept such as habitus is an attempt at 'macro' generalization at the level of what we 
would call 'micro' practices-let us call it a 'nexus concept' in which different scale-levels of 
social behavior are shown to be dialectically connected. Habitus shows itself in every social 
activity-we always embody the sociohistorical realities that formed us as individuals who take 
specific (nonrandom) positions in a social field .... "). 
27. See CHRIS HUTTON, LANGUAGE, MEANING AND THE LAW 34 (2009) ("[A]s we speak, 
write and listen, we are not constantly aware of contested labeling and the normativity of lan-
guage .... [A]llianguage use is potentially or latently monitored, contested or regulated by virtue 
of the fact that it can be represented as a form of behaviour, a judgment, 'making a statement.' 
Law is in this respect no different in essence from any other form oflanguage .... "). 
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(5) Periods of perceived instability often lead to efforts to preserve "order" by 
"shoring up" conventional "islands of meaning.,,28 The implementation of bi-
naries, like "masculine/feminine," is a common cognitive and rhetorical tech-
nique for those seeking to preserve a particular conception of the statns quo 
during periods of social change?9 
These principles will serve as useful lenses and tools for gaining an under-
standing of the cultural context in which design patents were situated and eval-
uated, and for parsing judicial rhetoric with the aim of shedding light on the 
courts' deep discourse on design. With that said, the analysis offered in this 
piece is neither an exhaustive nor self-contained alternative to doctrinal, eco-
nomic, or other factors contributing to the development of design-patent doc-
trine. 30 Indeed, anyone attempting to reveal the multiple layers of meaning of 
historical materials must make peace with the fact that the "probable and the 
speculative will coexist.,,3! But for reasons identified in this article, it is very 
probable indeed that turn-of-the-century gender and sexuality norms influ-
enced leading federal appellate decisions on design patents, depriving them of 
substantive power in litigation by 1930.32 While these decisions are just one 
"move in a complicated dance of interpretation engaged in by people acting in 
many different times and contexts, from many different positions of authority 
and influence,,,33 they were, as I will show, a pivotal part of the dance sur-
rounding the rights available in works of decorative design under U.S. law. 
28. See discussion ZERUBAVEL, supra note 16, at 64 et seq. 
29. See CYNTIDA EAGLE RUSSETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF 
WOMANHOOD 1 (1989). 
30. For example, many of the factors identified as causal by Du Mont, see generally supra 
note 7, likely played some role in the path of design-patent doctrine. However, Du Mont's meth-
odological approach largely treats the law as a culturally closed-off system; the extrinsic factors he 
does identify as potentially influencing the behavior of key actors are conventionally political and 
economic in nature. Here, by contrast, I examine the broader sociocultural context informing the 
complex cognitive dynamics at work in judicial "interpretation" of statutory language and courts' 
proffered reasoning for their rulings. My methodology is thus akin to that of ROSEN, supra note 8, 
at 12 Cto consider the styles of legal reasoning or the structure of cultural assumptions built into 
many legal concepts is to offer both a window into the larger culture and, no less importantly, to 
gain an often undervalued window into legal processes themselves"); perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
conclusions I reach differ markedly from those reached by Du Mont. 
31. C.G. Bateman, Method and Metaphysics: A Legal Historian's Canon, 23 J. JURIS. 255, 
278 n.90 (2014) (citing S.R. ELTON, THE PRACTICE OF HISTORY 87 (1967». See also Samaha, 
supra note 10, at III C[A]law-and-society perspective has an attenuated relationship to law as it 
is conventionally understood. What it gains in practical relevance is partly offset by what it loses 
in simplicity, tractability, and connection with ordinary ideas about law. As with legal textualism, 
this loss is beneficial for some purposes. [One] should investigate the relationship between legal 
institutions and the rest of society, partly because of the difficulty in establishing causation."). 
32. I speak of desigu patents' lack of substantive power because even after their evisceration, 
they retained some procedural value. Some parties sought them to obtain federal subject -matter 
jurisdiction to litigate unfair-competition claims. See discussion Colman, Part 2, supra note 6. 
33. Gordon, supra note 20, at 210. 
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I. CONGRESS'S 1842 CREATION 
OF DESIGN-PATENT PROTECTION, TO PROMOTE 
"THE PROGRESS OF THE DEC ORA TIVE ARTS" 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, most industrial objects in 
the United States were valued primarily for their "functional" characteristics. 
The iron stove provides a helpful example. 34 As historian Howell John Harris 
explains, "Stoves began to evolve from the traditional types in the early 1800s 
and particularly after the end of the War of 1812.,,35 While "[a] trickle of stove 
patents turned into a steady stream in the 1830s," the bulk of "inventors, de-
signers, and makers concentrat[ed] their efforts on increasing stoves' useful-
ness as heating and particularly as cooking devices.,,36 
Given this early focus on "utility," Harris notes, "[p]atent drawings, par-
ticularly for cooking stoves, were generally unadorned or displayed a few ap-
plied decorative motifs on otherwise plain surfaces.,,37 This began to change in 
the 1830s. In 1835, for example, the New York Mechanics' Institute first pro-
vided an official commendation to stove makers "for their 'beautiful' or 'very 
handsome' or 'very neat' products, as well as for their serviceability.,,38 At 
roughly the same time, the New York stove industry saw its first independent 
industrial-design firms, which soon cropped up in other cities. 39 
Design-patent protection would follow soon thereafter. Once the United 
States, like England, could claim its own contingent of tradesmen whose live-
lihood depended entirely on the appearance of consumer objects,40 Congress 
unsurprisingly found itself in receipt of pleas for the creation of intellectual-
property protection better suited to decorative objects than conventional utility 
patents or copyright.41 
Stove manufacturer Jordan L. Mott led the charge for design protection, 
authoring and submitting to the Senate in 1841 a document entitled "Petition 
of a Number of Manufacturers and Mechanics of the United States, Praying 
34. See Howell John Harris, "The Stove Trade Needs Change Continually": Designing the 
First Mass-Market Consumer Durable, ca. 1810-1930, 43 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 365, 366 
(2009) (calling stoves "an industry where design was critically important," making it "unusually 
dependent on the patent system-at first just for 'improvements' but after 1842, when the law 
began to permit it, for designs, too"). For an example of an early ornamented stove for which a 
design patent was obtained, see id. at 376 (Figure 11), reproduced as Figure 1, below. 
35.Id. at 368. 
36.Id. 
37.Id. 
38.Id. at 370 (internal footnote omitted). 
39.Id. at 371. 
40. See Ellen Marie Snyder, Victory over Nature: Victorian Cast-Iron Seating Furniture, 20 
WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 221, 223 (1985) ("By midcentury, American ironmaking assumed the 
technological capabilities the British had acquired years before, and American manufacturing 
grew rapidly."). See also Du Mont & Janis, supra note 4, at 854--55 ("By the early 1800s, an ac-
tive debate in England about expanding the Act culminated in a radical new design protection 
system beginning in 1839 [later] used as a model for American law.") (internal citations omitted). 
41. See generally Thomas B. Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent 
Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 380 (1948) (discussing pre-1842 American 
IP law). 
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the Adoption of Measures to Secure to Them Their Rights in Patterns and De-
signs.,,42 The coalition's petition was concerned primarily with "new designs 
for manufactures in metals," but it also noted that its arguments about free 
riding and progress applied with equal force to "designs or patterns for woven 
or other fabrics, and of ornaments on any articles of manufacture. ,,43 
The petitioners thus requested of Congress "the passage of an act, by 
which the rights of proprietors of new designs and patterns may be protected 
from piracy," so that "the manufacturers and mechanics of the United States 
may be enabled fully to compete with those of any other country" -that is, so 
the "articles manufactured by them would equal others in beauty.,,44 Congress 
obliged: the lobbying efforts of Mott and his coalition, facilitated and trans-
formed by a series of political tactics and twists,45 eventually yielded the en-
actment of the first American design patent law, in 1842.46 
Figure 1. Decorative Stove Design, U.S. Patent No. D40 (Jui. 25, 1846). 
428 
42. S. Doc. No. 154 (1841). 
43.ld. 
44.ld. 
45. Du Mont & Janis, supra note 4, at 856 et seq. 
46. Act of Aug. 29, 1842,5 Stat. 543. 
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The few commentators to study this topic have offered differing explana-
tions of both the reasons for the bill's passage and legislators' codification of 
design-patent protection within the existing utility-patent regime. 47 But all 
would likely agree that mainstream American legal rhetoric in the years after 
the enactment of design-patent law described these new rights as a vehicle for 
"promoting the progress of the decorative artS."48 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
would recite this orthodoxy in its first ruling, in 1871, on design-patent law: 
The acts of Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were 
plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts. They contem-
plate not so much utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression, 
or picture, but an aspect given to those objects mentioned in the acts .... The 
law manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and original appearances 
to a manufactured article may enhance its salable value, may enlarge the de-
mand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the public. It therefore pro-
poses to secure for a limited time to the ingenious producer of those appear-
ances the advantages flowing from them. 49 
The picture would soon grow complicated, however, for the decades after 
Congress passed its 1842 design-patent law saw the growth of a host of 
(largely negative) connotations surrounding "decoration" and "ornament," 
whose creators could claim exclusive rights in their work primarily or solely 
through design-patent protection. This dramatic semiotic evolution in the 
minds of the politically dominant segments of American societiO would have 
surprisingly far-reaching effects. 
II. SEX-ROLE ANXIETY AND MATERIAL CULTURE 
IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 
The nineteenth century was a time of unusually rapid cultural change for 
urban communities on the East Coast of the United States. 51 Middle- and 
upper-class white Anglo-Americans in the mid-nineteenth century were char-
47. Compare Du Mont & Janis, supra note 4, at 847, with Hudson, supra note 41, at 383. 
48. See id. at 845 CThe most venerable comments-those of the Supreme Court in 1870 in 
Gorham Co. v. White-assert . .. that the design patent provisions 'were plainly intended to give 
encouragement to the decorative arts,' a reference to the Constitution's intellectual property 
clause, with a slight adaptation for designs."). 
49. Gorham Mftg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 524-25 (1871). See also Glen Raven Knitting 
Mills v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, 189 F.2d 845,850 (4th Cir. 1951) CGorham Co. v. White ... sets 
forth the salient features of the statute and the purpose which it was designed to serve; but the 
court was concerned with the infringement and not the validity of the patent in suit."). 
50. When I speak of "Anglo-American culture" or "American society" in this piece, I am 
using such terms to refer to "the largely middle- and upper-class members of the public who held 
certain characteristic ideas and tried to govern their lives by them." LoUISE L. STEVENSON, THE 
VICTORIAN HOMEFRONT: AMERICAN THOUGHT & CULTURE, 1860--1880, xxviii (Cornell Univ. 
Press 2001) (1991). 
51. See PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA 124-25 (1978); 
THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN AMERICA: TRANSFORMATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 1876-
1915, at xi-xii (1991). See also ELAINE SHOWALTER, SEXUAL ANARCHY: GENDER AND CULTURE 
AT THE FIN DE SIECLE 17 (Bloomsbury Publ'g Ltd. 1991) (1990) (discussing dramatic social 
change in England during the same period). 
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acterized by, among other qualities, their "cherish[ing of] a belief in the sepa-
rate spheres of femininity and masculinity that amounted almost to religious 
faith.,,52 The stakes of keeping the categories of male and female separate 
struck many as very high, indeed,53 and would only rise as the turn of the cen-
tury approached. 54 
As the decades passed, nineteenth-century Americans' notions of the 
"feminine" grew ever more strongly associated with "mutability of identity, 
distractability, [and] a continuous search for the new and fashionable," all of 
which purportedly illustrated the "instability, unreliability, compulsiveness, 
and superficiality" of the female sex. 55 The archetypal man of comparable so-
cial station, by contrast, 56 was often imagined and represented as honest (in 
both behavior and appearance57 ), industrious, 58 and restrained in consump-
52. [d. at 150. Accord ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 211-12 (Phillips 
Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1840) (,,[Americans] admit that as nature 
has appointed such wide differences between the physical and moral constitution of man and 
woman, her manifest design was to give a distinct employment to their various faculties .... In no 
country has such constant care been taken as in America to trace two clearly distinct lines of ac-
tion for the two sexes and to make them keep pace one with the other, but in two pathways that are 
always different. American women never manage the outward concerns of the family or conduct a 
business or take a part in political life; nor are they, on the other hand, ever compelled to perform 
the rough labor of the fields or to make any of those laborious efforts which demand the exertion 
of physical strength."). 
53. See BRAM DIJKSTRA, IDOLS OF PERVERSITY 64 (1986). 
54. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 4 (,,[Panic in the face of supposed 'sexual anarchy' 
was] typical ofthejin de siecle. In periods of cultural insecurity, when there are fears or regression 
and degeneration, the longing for strict border controls around the definition of gender, as well as 
race, class, and nationality, becomes especially intense."). In nineteenth-century Anglo-American 
culture, just as today, notions of race were inextricably linked with ideas about gender. See discus-
sion CELIA ROBERTS, MESSENGERS OF SEX: HORMONES, BIOMEDICINE AND FEMINISM 118-19 
(2007) ("Numerous historians have suggested that [Victorian] understandings of the sexes as 
opposite and/or complementary were intertwined with discourses on racial differences."). These 
discourses are always difficult to untangle, let alone in a single piece of IP scholarship. See Sally 
Markowitz, Pelvic Politics: Sexual Dimorphism and Racial Difference, 26 SIGNS: J. WOMEN 
CULTURE & SOC'Y 389,389 (2001) ("[T]he logic of the race/sex/gender connection in the modern 
West is so tangled and opaque that even the best-intentioned analysis is likely to come up short."). 
However, I do briefly discuss race and nationality. See infra notes 90--96. 
55. See LIZ CONOR, THE SPECTACULAR MODERN WOMAN: FEMININE VISIBILITY IN THE 
1920s 27 (2004); see also id. ("[M]odern feminine visibility harbored meanings of artifice super-
ficiality, standardization, and mechanization: Mack's Modern Girl is 'made up,' with dress and 
cosmetics, to represent the image of modern femininity .... [T]he very process of her imaging, as 
mass-produced, recalled another epistemic relation [besides that of image and reality], that be-
tween representation, illusion, and the feminine."). 
56. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 25 ("Contrast was the essence of the matrimonial 
relation: feminine weakness contrasted with masculine strength: masculine egotism with feminine 
self-devotion."') (emphasis added) (citation omitted); ALAN SINFIELD, THE WILDE CENTURY: 
EFFEMINACY, OSCAR WILDE, AND THE QUEER MOMENT 149-50 (1994) ("Of course, sexual rela-
tions cannot be isolated from the social hierarchies in which they are embedded .... "). 
57. See CHRISTOPHER BREWARD, THE CULTURE OF FASHION 176 (1995) (highlighting 1860s 
social commentary objecting to "sartorial affectations" and, indeed, "any sort of adopted style or 
manner," on the basis that "[a] man's bearing should be a natural expression of his own mind and 
body" (quoting BRUCE HALEY, THE HEALTHY BODY AND VICTORIAN CULTURE 206 (1978)). See 
also id. at 173 (emphasizing, through nineteenth-century illustrations, that "[m]en's dress of the 
1830s and' 40s allowed for a fair degree of self-expression, especially in terms of pattern and cut," 
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tion.59 The web of associations surrounding the central axis of "manly" sobri-
ety/candor and "feminine" frivolity/artifice gradually grew more elaborate and 
emphatic; by the turn of the century, fashionable women were widely assumed 
to be dishonest, lascivious, idle, and/or depraved.60 To combat this trend, the 
"moral" woman was repeatedly instructed to devote her entire existence to 
family and the home in which that family resided, an imagined "haven" from 
the perceived immorality of urban life. 6l 
The expanding scope and vigor of stigmatized characteristics of the 
woman of fashionable tastes and habits can be attributed in part to what many 
perceived as her challenge to the comfortable foundation of the male/female 
duality on which much of Anglo-American culture was imagined to rest. 62 
While the causes for this phenomenon are complex, it is clear reactionaries 
were motivated in part by a challenge to cultural infrastructure by a confluence 
of events and developments, including women's large-scale entry into the 
realms of higher education, the workforce, the political sphere, and the realm 
of public consumption. 63 As the decades of the second half of the nineteenth 
century passed, "[t]he sexual borderline between the masculine and feminine 
[increasingly] represented the dangerous vanishing point of sexual differ-
ence.,,64 The onslaught of destabilizing cultural changes 65 "engendered a fierce 
response in social purity campaigns, a renewed sense of public moral concern, 
while "[t]he 1860s present the archetypal image of nineteenth century masculinity: dark, dour, and 
domineering"). 
58. See id. at 176 (highlighting same 1860s social commentary distinguishing virtuous man 
from "that lounging semi-swaggering, confoundedly lackadaisical manner which [some] have 
adopted in compliment ... to the real swell, and the man of fashion") (quoting HALEY, supra note 
57, at 206). 
59. See id. at 175 (highlighting 1859 social commentary making "muscular Christian exhor-
tations to celibacy and self-denial"). 
60. DIJKSTRA, supra note 53, at 64. 
61. RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PuBLIC MAN 19-20 (1974) ("[P]eople put more em-
phasis on protecting themselves from [large-scale social changes]. The family became one of these 
shields. During the 19th Century the family came to appear less and less the center of a particular, 
nonpublic region, more an idealized refuge, a world all its own, with higher moral value than the 
public realm. The bourgeois family was idealized as life wherein order and authority were unchal-
lenged, security of material existence could be a concomitant of real marital love, and the transac-
tions between members of the family would brook no outside scrutiny. As the family became a 
refuge from the terrors of society, it gradually became also a moral yardstick .... "). 
62. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 8-9 ("The nineteenth century had cherished a belief 
in the separate spheres of femininity and masculinity that amount almost to religious faith .... 
What was most alarming to the fin de siecle was that sexuality and sexual roles might no longer be 
contained within the neat and permanent borderlines of gender categories."). 
63. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 8-10. See also GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS & 
CWILIZATION 13-14 (1995). 
64. SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 8. 
65. RUSSETT, supra note 29, at 7-9 ("By the third quarter of the century women were laying 
claim to rights and opportunities previously reserved for men. The lead in the agitation for 
women's rights gathering momentum in the last third of the nineteenth century was taken in 
America .... [Working women], like the female doctors and suffragists and the New Women of 
all persuasions, contributed to the perceived threat to the established social order .... This so-
called 'revolt of women' challenged not only the curtailment of women's civil liberties but also 
the Victorian code of propriety that mandated female innocence in such matters."). 
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and demands, often successful, for restrictive legislation and censorship.,,66 
Increasingly, gender roles were "publicly, even spectacularly, encoded and 
enforced,,67 (including in the courtroom68). 
No aspect of behavior, human endeavor, or material object, no matter how 
seemingly "trivial" or semiotic ally blank, was immune from the increasingly 
intensive sex-norm-policing that took place in the urban United States of the 
late nineteenth century. 69 The advent of the American Industrial Revolution 
meant there were far more designed objects, at far more affordable prices, than 
ever before. 70 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the large-scale tech-
nological and labor developments facilitated the acquisition, by the American 
"middle class," of an ever-wider variety of consumer objects for purely aes-
thetic and pleasurable ends. 71 
66.SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 3. 
67.Id. (quoting RICHARD DELLAMORA, MASCULINE DESIRE 194 (1990); see also HOLLIS 
CLAYSON, PAINTED LoVE: PROSTITUTION IN FRENCH ART OF THE IMPRESSIONIST ERA 58 (1991) 
CSelf-adornment and sexual allure were closely connected in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century because dress had come to distinguish gender in more exaggerated ways."). 
68. State supreme courts' rnlings on marriage promises are instrnctive. See Boigneres v. 
Boulon, 54 Cal. 146, 147 (1880) (mistress sued over repudiated marriage promise, but "such 
promise [of sexual] surrender on the part of the woman is not sufficient consideration for a prom-
ise of marriage, because immoral, illegal, and against public policy."); cf Kurtz v. Frank, 76 Ind. 
594, 598 (1881) CIt does not appear that the illicit intercourse entered into the consideration of the 
marriage contract, but [rather that] the appellant, having agreed to marry the appellee at a time 
then in the future, obtained the intercourse upon an assurance that, if pregnancy resulted, the con-
tract already made should be performed at once."). 
69. Chris Fowler, From Identity and Material Culture to Personhood and Materiality, in 
MARY C. BEAUDRY & DAN HICKS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MATERIAL CULTURE STUDIES 
352, 359-60 (2010) CIdentities are produced out of the ongoing interactions between people and 
things, not just different groups of people .... [Tlhe ability to consider this mutual constitution of 
people and things, materials and cultures, is a prerequisite for any sophisticated analysis of mate-
rial culture and identity. At the same time, the co-emergence of material worlds and types of iden-
tities needs to be placed in the context of social and political interactions."). 
70. See generally WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE (1993). 
71. See SCHLERETH, supra note 51, at 121 (describing the late nineteenth-century American 
"compulsion to purchase, accumulate, and display possessions"); COLIN SPENCER, 
HOMOSEXUALITY IN HISTORY 194, 194-95 (1995) CThe beginnings of the Industrial Revolution 
meant a little more money for the lower classes [and] the beginnings of a new social obsession 
.... By the eighteenth century [in England-and the mid-nineteenth century in the United States] 
almost everyone had a money income and was prepared to spend it. A huge increase in small rural 
factories producing non-essential goods occurred at this time .... "); STEVENSON, supra note 50, at 
xxxi C[T]he Victorian social world of the l860s and l870s was, by and large, the world of the 
middle class. Still, being Victorian was a matter of values and beliefs; belonging to the middle 
class had more to do with economic position. People could be Victorian without belonging to the 
middle class, or they could belong to the middle class without being Victorian." Nevertheless, the 
members of the group under examination "all shared one vocabulary and one set of key assump-
tions about life," even as historical evidence reveals "different ways that different Victorians drew 
upon and used them."). To be sure, not everyone was able to partake in this new bounty. See 
Susan Porter Benson, Living on the Margin: Working Class Marriages and Family Survival 
Strategies in the United States, 1919-1941, in THE SEX OF TmNGS: GENDER AND CONSUMPTION 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 13, at 212 (noting that many "American working-class 
families remained on the margins of the emerging world of consumptions because their incomes 
were neither large enough nor steady enough to allow the wide range of discretionary spending 
usually associated with mass consumption"). Further, as Benson recounts, the gendered divisions 
that pervaded middle-class mores and imagination were often absent-or complicated-in 
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This included an explosion in the availability of fashionable apparel, 
which proved to be one of the most powerful tools for ensuring compliance 
with gender roles and associated notions of morality. 72 For one thing, dress 
was the most immediate, visually recognizable, nonbiological demarcation 
between the sexes. But dress was also strongly linked with myriad normative 
notions about gender, for women could only engage in certain public activities 
to the extent their attire did not make it impractical to do SO.73 Fashionable 
apparel design thus carried with it multifaceted political and moral notions of 
women's "proper" role and place. 74 
Many commentators of the time period wrote tracts making clear that 
fashionable dress, as the most marked component of personal presentation, 
carried increasingly strong normative overtones about the proper roles and 
characteristics of women. 75 "Social reformers" announced that female van-
ity76-closely linked in the popular imagination with artifice, imitation, exces-
working-class culture. See generally id. I acknowledge this plurality of experiences during the 
relevant time period, even as I focus on the middle-class ideology that proved influential in the 
worldviews and self-policing of public figures. 
72. Ed Cohen, The Double Lives of Man: Narration and Identification in Late Nineteenth-
Century Representations of Ec-centric Masculinities, in CULTURAL POLITICS AT THE FIN DE 
SIECLE 99 (Sally Ledger & Scott McCracken eds., 1995) (characterizing nineteenth-century dress 
as "a metonym for socially inscribed forms of femininity"); Kate Haulman, Fashion and the 
Culture Wars of Revolutionary Philadelphia, 62 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY 625, 627 
(2005) CThere seemed no way to bring the logic of power based on personal display and distinc-
tion into line with patriot prescriptions of homespun simplicity and conformity."). 
73. See ANNE HOLLANDER, SEX AND SUITS 136 (1994) COnly men's clothing, with suits 
being the last version, expressed the idea of a man's body as a visibly working, self-aware and 
unified instrument."); SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 24 CIt was an easier explanation [for nine-
teenth-century Anglo-American men] to see women's desire for emancipation as a form ofunbal-
ance in the reproductive system and mind that to take it seriously; and the argument was doubly 
useful because it also showed how dangerous to the public would be 'the incorporation of these 
instabilities into the structures of political life."'); STEVENSON, supra note 50, at 15 (discussing 
activities and spaces that were "safe" for middle-class women in the mid-nineteenth century). 
Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that "fashion and, for that matter, ... the clothing code 
of the West generally, [constitutes] a principle means, as much actual as symbolic by which the 
institutions of patriarchy have managed over the centuries to oppress women and to relegate them 
to inferior social status." FRED DAVIS, FASHION, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY 81 (1994). 
74. See generally CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK, 
1789-1860 (rev. ed. 1987). Working-class men in early 1800s New York City, for example, could 
engage in various activities, from working outside the home to drinking at pubs, that -if under-
taken by women, could easily suggest a "determination to serve herself at the expense of others," 
or worse. Id. at 80. Perhaps the most innocuous meaning of such behavior was that the offending 
women were "bad housekeepers who disregarded men's domestic needs," thereby breaching "the 
customary deference due to men." Id. See also SENNETT, supra note 61, at 178-83. 
75. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 110 (Dover 1994) 
(1899) CIt grates painfully on our nerves to contemplate the necessity of any well-bred woman's 
earning a livelihood by useful work. It is not 'woman's sphere.' Her sphere is within the house-
hold, which she should 'beautifY,' and of which she should be the chief ornament."). See also 
CLAYSON, supra note 67, at 79 (noting that 1880s Impressionist paintings frequently "display[ed] 
female sexuality a something of a threat, and [located] this threat specifically in the realm of mod-
em fashion"). 
76. See Jacque Lynn Foltyn, The Importance of Being Beautiful: The Social Construction of 
the Beautiful Self 323 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with U.c. San Diego 
Library) CPainters have long depicted 'Vanity' as a woman, a mirror serving as her prop."). Fig-
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sive consumption, moral decay, and even prostitution-unless discouraged, 
would ultimately lead women to opt out of bearing children. 77 
Figure 2. "P. Pry," that is, W. Heath, "The Fashion Behind 
but not Behind the Fashion" (1829) 
ure 2, above, has been characterized thus: "The artist pokes fun both at the huge ribboned hat, the 
vast balloon-like sleeves, and the wide skirts lined with horsehair (or a similar stiffening) which 
immodestly reveal so much of the ankle." AILEEN RIBEIRO, DRESS AND MORALITY 127 (1986). 
77. See CLAYSON, supra note 67, at 60 CA decent woman for whom shopping was an obses-
sion rather than a simple devoir was in danger of falling from the path of respectability and man-
ageability, whereas the deviant woman who dressed to the nines was ipso facto immoral and could 
also inflict societal damage by infecting the lady with an uncontrollable taste for extravagant 
clothes."); DIJKSTRA, supra note 53, at 94 (on paintings of "nasty women, with nonexistent chil-
dren gnawing like an evil conscious at their uselessly voluptuous breasts" portrayed as "mere 
empty shells of what they might have been had they not forsaken the sacred duties of motherhood 
to pursue their lascivious private pleasures."); RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 127-28 (the "perfect 
lady" was praised as displaying "refinement and gentility," while women "showing off in public in 
unsuitably expensive and luxurious dress" were denounced as "vulgar" -displaying what com-
mentators of the time decried as "indulgence in personal luxury in women [to] injurious effect on 
the moral tone, [that is] the first symptom, if not the cause, of a relaxation in virtue. "'). 
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TilE FAST SMOKING GIRL OF THE 
PERIOI>. 
Figure 3. "The Fast Smoking Girl of the Period" (1867)78 
78. See RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 138-43 (image and its caption provided as an example of 
"fast" girl, a figure depicted "frequently injourualism of the late 1860s" by those professing con-
cern about the purported risk of women abandoning family and virtue for the "world of men"). 
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The pursuit of overtly "materialistic" interests by women struck many as 
presenting a "central contradiction" between woman-as-insatiable-consumer 
and "the transcendental innocence of the model wife and mother.,,79 This trope 
gained newfound momentum in the United States in the 1830s and exerted an 
increasingly powerful grip on the popular consciousness. To illustrate, the No-
vember 1861 issue of a leading women's magazine, Godey's Lady's Book 
drew an explicit connection between female fashionability and dangers to the 
health of both mothers and children: 
We have before warned our readers against the "most pernicious practice," 
the dire effects of which are so forcibly presented [earlier in the magazine]; 
but so prevalent is this evil, and such is the bending power of fashion, that the 
subject cannot be too often or too strongly urged upon the attention of 
mothers. The above remarks are as applicable to every part of our country as 
to the city of Paris, for from Paris we receive our fashions, and with Paris we 
must suffer the dreadful consequences of following the senseless requisitions 
of vanity and folly in preference to the plain dictates of reason, physiology, 
and common sense. Mothers can never expect health for themselves and their 
children until they make the laws of health their gnide, instead of the decrees 
of fashion; until they study physiology and hygiene more, and French fashion-
plates less. 8o 
Thus, attacks on the "immodesty" of fashionable dress increasingly gave way 
to allegations of "moral degeneracy in women of all ages who copy the 
fashionable ideal, the woman of the demi-monde.,,81 Whereas "[i]n the time of 
crinoline" the fashionable woman had "sacrificed decency," by 1870 ("the 
times of trains"), the same woman now "sacrifice [ d] cleanliness" through her 
"false and fatal brilliancy.,,82 By the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
fashionable design in women's dress had accrued myriad negative associations 
in middle-class American culture. 83 
79. See CHRISTOPHER BREWARD, THE HIDDEN CONSUMER: MASCULINITIES, FASHION AND 
CITY LIFE, 1860-1914,3 (1999). 
80. Jno. Stainback Wilson, Health Department, GODEY'S LADY'S BOOK, Nov. 1861, at 444 
http://www.accessible-archives.coml20 11 III Ithe-dangers-of-bare-arms-in -godeys-lad ys-book/#ixz 
z3NxpGgXtH. Godey's Lady's Book had risen to a circulation of 150,000 by 1960, walking an 
uncomfortable line between moralizing and luring readers with its depictions of the latest fashions. 
Perhaps tellingly, its influence as "the arbiter of American taste" was waning in the l860s, ANN 
DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 94 (1977), the same period in which the 
exclusively fashion-oriented Harper's Bazar CA repository of Fashion, Pleasure and Instruction") 
rose to preeminence for its depiction of the latest fashions, which saw "the gentle, rather delicate 
aspect of mid-Victoriana [giving] way to a heavier, more obvious display of opulence." 
VICTORIAN FASHIONS AND COSTUMES FROM HARPER'S BAZAR: 1867-1898, at v, 3 (Stella Blum 
ed., 1974) [hereinafter VICTORIAN FASHIONS AND COSTUMES]. 
81. See RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 135 (quoting E. LYNN LINTON, THE FAST SMOKING GIRL 
OF THE PERIOD 4 (1868». 
82. See id. at 135, 138 (quoting LINTON, supra note 81, at 4; E. LYNN LINTON, 1 THE GIRL 
OF THE PERIOD 313 (rev. ed. 1883». 
83. The symbolic power of fashion was due, in part, to the explosion of popularity in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, of the (pseudo-)scientific practice alternately referred to as 
"phrenology," "ethology," or "physiognomy," which purported to make legible to the careful 
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These stigmas bespoke far more than mere misogyny; they evinced a gen-
eral anxiety among large segments of nineteenth-century American society 
concerning the blurring of traditionally imagined gender roles. 84 Thus, it 
should come as little surprise that the visual policing described above was a 
two-way street: even as a desire for fashionable dress was increasingly stigma-
tized a moral failing of women, would-be "respectable" men displaying an 
affinity for decoration in their appearance were charged with ever-greater fail-
ings. 85 In a cultural shift described as "The Great Masculine Renunciation,,,86 
the second and third decades of the nineteenth century saw "the last gasp of 
the male peacock before the ensuing triumph of middle-class sobriety in dress 
which is still, to a large extent, with us today.,,87 Individuals purportedly failed 
in their role as men by falling prey to the vices typically associated with "the 
weaker sex.,,88 Historian Kate Haulman elaborates on these new beliefs: 
[Men in dominant social positions] projected [fashion's] morally question-
able elements onto women and other feminized figures such as fops and the 
French. Ideally, attire established gender identity and the distinction between 
male and female. But sometimes a fashion confused those designations, ei-
ther by failing to be appropriately masculine or feminine enough for its 
wearer, who (according to detractors) mimicked the effect and usurped the 
prerogatives of the other gender, or by bespeaking an excess of feminine 
traits such as vanity .... 89 
observer of physical appearance an individual's temperament, moral fiber, motivations and de-
sires, and other aspects of (the relatively new concept of) "personality." See SENNETT, supra note 
61, at 171; id. at 167 ("As people's personalities came to be seen in their appearances, facts of 
class and sex thus became matters of real anxiety . . . . A man might or might not be what his 
clothes proclaimed, but the proclamation was [purportedly] cleaL"). See also MARY DOUGLAS & 
BARON ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD OF GoODS: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION 
xxiv (Routledge 2001) (1979). 
84. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 3-9. 
85. See BREWARD, supra note 57, at 170--71 ("[A] discourse of separate spheres, whilst 
constructing display and dress as innately feminine pursuits, enforced a model of masculinity in 
which overt interest in clothing and appearance automatically implied a tendency toward unmanli-
ness and effeminacy."). 
86. The tenn "The Great Masculine Renunciation," while subsequently critiqued, modified, 
and discredited by certain cultural theorists and historians of dress and visual culture, is widely 
believed to have been coined by J.e. FLlJGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOTHES 111 et seq. (1930) 
(section on "The Great Masculine Renunciation and Its Causes" in ch. VII). 
87. RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 122. 
88. See VEBLEN, supra note 75, at 112 ("There are of course also free men, and not a few of 
them, who, in their blind zeal for faultlessly reputable attire, transgress the theoretical line between 
man's and woman's dress, to the extent of arraying themselves in apparel that is obviously de-
signed to vex the mortal frame; but everyone recognizes without hesitation that such apparel for 
men is a departure from the nonnal. We are in the habit of saying that such dress is 'effemi-
nate' .... "); ELIZABETH WILSON, ADORNED IN DREAMS: FASHION AND MODERNITY 179 (I.B. 
Tauris 2013) ("Before 1960s, 'only tarts or homosexuals wore clothes which reflected what they 
were."') (quoting GEORGE MELLY, REVOLT INTO STYLE: THE POP ARTS IN BRITAIN (1972)). 
89. Haulman, supra note 72, at 627. See RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 125 ("[From the 1830s 
onward in Anglo-American culture,] 'the merest hint of femininity in a man's wardrobe was re-
garded with deep visceral aversion.' Among the upper and middle classes, the only acceptable 
touch of colour was the waistcoat until the 1860s; from then onwards even that was abandoned 
and men wore a dark three-piece suit on most occasions, except for evening wear when a white 
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Failure "to be appropriately masculine," by the mid-nineteenth century, 
meant more than vulnerability to social ridicule. (As explained below, how-
ever, "effeminacy" was not decisively linked with identity-based conceptions 
of "homosexuality" until the final years of the l800s. 90) Through a complex 
matrix of political, economic, and scientific developments, normative Anglo-
American masculinity had come to carry with it a particular set of values and 
priorities--{)ne undergirded, by the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the 
often-intermingled theories of "utilitarianism" and "evolutionary science.,,91 
American economist Thorstein Veblen captured a key aspect of the new mid-
dle-class orthodoxy with his philosophy of an "ideal world [that had] no place 
for the irrational or the non-utilitarian" in which "the stylistic oddities of 
fashion were manifestly futile."n Writer and public intellectual H.G. Wells 
explicitly linked fashionable trimmings to the female sex, "backward" civiliza-
tions, and failures of intellectual development, declaring: "Women, disarmed 
of their distinctive barbaric adornments, the feathers, beads, lace, and trim-
mings [would be able share in] the counsels and intellectual development of 
men.,,93 English psychologist J.e. Flugel would later reflect that it was "per-
haps no mere chance that a period of unexampled scientific progress should 
have followed the abandonment of ornamental clothing on the part of men at 
the beginning of the last century.,,94 Less measured nineteenth-century com-
waistcoat was de rigueur.") (quoting QUENTIN BELL, ON HUMAN FINERY 143 (rev. ed. 1976)). 
Although this passage specifically concerns dress codes in London, the same trends and themes 
can be traced in American cities like Boston and New York, except where otherwise noted. See, 
e.g., id. at 182 n.ll (noting that English novelist William Thackerey's Vanity Fair "mocks the 
false decornm of 'the trnly refined English or American female"'). 
90. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 145-49; accord RIBEIRO, supra note 76, 
at 125-26 (noting, based on 1847 text The Natural History of the Gent, that men dressed in bright 
colors, "loud cravats and tie-pins, and bright yellow kid gloves over which are worn lots of 
rings"-though likely to be described as "effeminate" even at that time-were infamous for 
"star[ing] at women bathers" and "accost[ing] respectable women in the street"). 
91. RUSSETT, supra note 29. See also THOMAS HODGSKIN, POPULAR POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
FOUR LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE LONDON MECHANICS' INSTITUTION 240-41 (1827) (em-
phasis added). 
92. WILSON, supra note 88, at 52-53. 
93. See Michael Carter, Fashion and Adornment, in GIORGIO RIELLO & PETER McNEIL, 
EDS., THE FASHION HISTORY READER: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 529 (Giorgio Riello & Peter 
McNeil eds.) (2010) (reciting a comment attributed to H.G. Wells). 
94. FLlJGEL, supra note 86, at 118. Social theorist Georg Simmel's 1904 condemnation of 
fashionable individuals is telling: "The fact that the demi-monde is so frequently a pioneer in 
matters of fashion is due to its peculiarly uprooted form of life. The pariah existence to which 
society condemns the demi-monde produces an open or latent hatred against [social rules and law, 
which takes] aesthetic expression in the striving for ever new forms of appearance." GEORG 
SIMMEL, Fashion, in GEORG SIMMEL: ON INDNIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 311 (Daniel N. 
Levine ed., 1971). See also ADOLF Loos, Ornament and Crime, in PROGRAMS AND MANIFESTOES 
ON 20TH-CENTURY ARCHITECTURE 24 (Ulrich Conrads ed., Michael Bullock Trans., 1970) ("Ab-
sence of ornament has brought the other arts to unsuspected heights. Beethoven's symphonies 
would never have been written by a man who had to walk about in silk, satin, and lace.") As the 
Loos excerpt illustrates, "fashion" was positioned in opposition to legitimate and valuable cultural 
innovation. Cj Edward Sapir, Fashion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6, 139 
(Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1931) (asserting that a short-lived fashion is likely to have "something 
unexpected, irresponsible or bizarre about it," and predicting that "[a]ny fashion which sins 
against one's sense of style and one's feeling for the historical continuity of style is likely to be 
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mentators casually extrapolated Darwinian ideas about the survival of partic-
ular species to the fate of society at large, explicitly blaming "effeminacy" for 
"the decline and fall of states.,,95 Even Teddy Roosevelt opined: "There is no 
place in the world for nations who have become enervated by the soft and easy 
life, or who have lost their fibre of vigorous hardness and masculinity.,,96 
By the turn of the twentieth century, mainstream middle-class ideology in 
the United States held that the sort of people who invested time and money in 
fashionable dress were by and large "idle, parasitical, artificial, vicious, and 
frivolous.,,97 (At the same time, women who discarded dresses in favor of out-
fits made up of a "jacket and skirt based on the male suit" found that their 
new, ostensibly more "natural" and "useful" apparel was immediately decried 
as "unbecoming and unseemly ... , as any imitation of man's attire must be 
for a woman.,,98 Virtue, apparently, was the exclusive province of men.) 
Thus, fashionable dress was an enormously important symbolic medium 
at the fin de siecle; however, it was by no means alone in its gendered, socio-
political resonance. A wide variety of designed objects, especially "acces-
sories" displaying increasingly "rich trimming," carried powerful symbolic 
connotations about one's true character and appropriate role in American so-
dismissed as a fad"); cf Harmon Paper Co. v. Prager, 287 F. 841, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1923) (Manton, 
J., dissenting) ("[The] demand [for plaintiff's wallpaper design] was not bronght abont throngh an 
advertising campaign. Apparently the paper sold on its merit. Nor can it be said that it was due to a 
fashion or caprice of the public. It has continued and increased during a period of four years. It is 
more than a fashion, for fashions are not likely to last that long. I regard this as persuasive evi-
dence of invention."). 
95. RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 126. Accord SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 4 (sexual differ-
ence was one of the "threatened borders of the fin de si(xle," and "fears of degeneration and col-
lapse" meant that "England was often compared [unfavorably] to decadent Greece and Rome"). 
See ROBERTS, supra note 54, at 118-19 (,,[Historian Nancy Leys Stepan argues] that the nine-
teenth-century focus on binary sexual difference and racial difference was partially enabled by an 
analogy between sexual difference and racial difference, whereby supposed deficiencies were 
found in both [white] women and non-European people of both sexes. The analogy between sex 
and race ... was supported by evolutionary discourse in which [white] women's inferior position 
in relation to [white] men was explained by their retention of features of 'primitive races. "'). 
96. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 10. Cf DAVID KUCHTA, THE THREE-PIECE SUIT AND 
MODERN MASCULINITY: ENGLAND, 1550-1850, 3 (2002) ("Understanding the importance of 
ideals of masculinity to notions of politics, economics, and the social order, then, allows us to 
understand the basis for the birth and continued relevance of [the] three-piece suit.") (internal 
footnotes omitted). See also EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF 
NEW YORK CITY TO 1898, 1192-93 (1999) (discussing various reform movements in New York 
City starting in the l880s, in which powerful coalitions sought "moral and political reform" de-
clared necessary to rebuild decaying city infrastructure by, among other things, ensuring govern-
ment decisions were made "solely in the interests of efficiency and economy," thereby "ending 
extravagance and corruption"). 
97. KUCHTA, supra note 96, at 148 (citing BARBARA TAYLOR, EVE AND THE NEW 
JERUSALEM: SOCIALISM AND FEMINISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3-5 (1983)). See also 
BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 96, at 1151 (highlighting direct connection between the New 
York theater world's "public sensuality" and "commercialization of sex" and popular---even na-
tional-trends concerning women's "choice of clothes, jewelry, and millinery"). 
98. See VICTORIAN FASHIONS AND COSTUMES, supra note 80, at vii ("All accessories-
gloves, handkerchiefs, hair ornaments, jewelry, aprons, shoes and stockings-provided surfaces to 
be decorated. None escaped the love of rich trimming."). 
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ciety.99 Such designed objects ranged from handkerchiefs to parlor furniture, 
all of which were increasingly gender-coded and scrutinized for gender con-
formity as the century wore on. 100 
"Decorative" furnishings for the home, in particular, proved powerfully 
complementary to fashionable dress in the surveillance of gender norms 
through aesthetics. 101 As the nineteenth century progressed, increasing 
99. See DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 83, at xxiv (noting that "goods are like flags" 
in that they "work as communicators" among the members of industrialized societies); GILLES 
LIpOVETSKY, THE EMPIRE OF FASHION: DRESSING MODERN DEMOCRACY 203 (Catherine Porter 
trans. 1994) CLike objects and mass culture, major discourses about meaning are caught up in the 
irrepressible logic of novelty, carried away by a turbulence that may not be absolutely identical to 
fashion in the narrow sense but is nevertheless analogous in principle."). 
100. See, e.g., SCHLERETH, supra note 51, at 122 CMen and women knew where to sit, since 
parlor furniture was gender distinctive. Gentlemen's chairs were throne like, higher than lady's 
chairs and with arms. Ladies chairs lacked arms (in part to accommodate their full skirts) and were 
designed to reinforce the era's postural requirements for women-to sit upright, away from the 
chair back, with one's hands folded in one's lap."). See Victoria de Grazia, Changing Cultural 
Regimes, in THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER AND CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 13, at ll, 15 (throughout the nineteenth century, objects "defined as irrational [or] 
superlluous" were increasingly "identified with the female population"). See also CLAYSON, 
supra note 67, at 64 CAn ordinary woman's lively interest in shopping and clothing provoked 
worries of [ a particular] sort. It was believed that women were vulnerable to a form of psycholog-
ical distress known as the delirium of consumption, an exclusively female affliction. "). It is im-
portant to note that the relationship of the gender-coding of objects and the purported evaluation of 
the morality of a member of either sex was, and is, more complex than simply checking off a 
series of boxes for gender-matching. See discussion Abigail Solomon-Godeau, The Other Side of 
Venus, The Visual Economy of Feminine Display, in THE SEX OF THINGS: GENDER AND 
CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 13, at 113-14, 145 n.3 CIn using the 
term 'femininity,' I am referring to a social and psychosexual concept, which I largely disassociate 
from its ostensible referent-biological women. I take 'femininity' and 'masculinity,' to be his-
torically shifting and mobile models and roles, forged on the level of the symbolic, which col-
lectively represent a culture's gender ideology. The antifoundationalist, anti-essentialist, social 
constructivist position taken here has now a substantial bibliography."). These complexities are 
suggested by an illuminating mid-nineteenth-century account of the decline in the sociallegiti-
macy of lace, in which a female writer traced the fall of the material to its declining popularity 
among men. See MRS. BURY PALLISTER, A HISTORY OF LACE 8, 9 (rev. ed. 1869) CNor does the 
occupation [of creating lace] appear to have been solely confined to females .... [I]n the frontis-
pieces of some early pattern books of the sixteenth century, men are represented working at 
frames, and these books are stated to have been written 'for the profit of men, as well as of 
women.' ... Till a very late date we have ample record of the esteem in which this art was held . 
. . From the middle of the [eighteenth] century, or, rather, apparently from the French Revolution, 
the more artistic style of needlework and embroidery fell into decadence. The simplicity of male 
costume rendered it a less necessary adjunct to female, or indeed, male education; for it seems 
strange, but two of the greatest generals of the Republic, Hoche and Moreau, followed the employ-
ment of embroidering satin waistcoats long after they had entered the military service."). Addi-
tional complexities, a full discussion of which is not possible given the space constraints of this 
article, arise from the effect of the elision of the symbolic logic of the public and private spheres 
on the communicative codes of the objects of material culture. See SENNETT, supra note 61, at 180 
(from approximately the mid-1860s onward, the "struggle for order in the family process was 
generated by the same rules of cognition which made people see the workings of [American] 
society in personal terms."). Cf RIBEIRO, supra note 76, at 133 (before the 1860s, criticism of the 
"immodesty" of unconventional women's dress tended to be leveled "mainly on the grounds that it 
was worn in public"). 
10 1. Historian Louise Stevenson explains the evolution of ideas about the proper decoration 
of the Victorian home parlor in the United States after the Civil War, when "the production of 
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numbers of Anglo-American individuals and families had sufficient disposable 
income to spend money on so-called "nonessential" objects. 102 Historian 
Thomas Schlereth notes that in "an economy of expanding consumer choice, 
home furnishings"-like fashionable dress-"came and went as never 
before." 103 This new dynamics can be observed in the appearance of the 
typical Anglo-American middle-class parlor, a "densely draped, ornamented, 
and furnished space that symbolized the Victorian compulsion to accumulate 
and display possessions."I04 
Figure 4. Robert Slingsby, Domestic Interior (1889) 
consumer goods increased" dramatically. STEVENSON, supra note 50, at 10. Many people selected 
"home decorations [that] nurtnred the Christian development of family members," and mothers 
sought to instill values in children "through their choice of parlor decorations." Id. at 8, 9. 
102. See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE SYSTEM OF OBJECTS 49 (Verso 2005) (1968) (When 
"[the p]rimary functions [of objects] are overwritten by secondary ones, by relationship and cal-
culation ... [then] instinctual drives give way to cultural connotation."). 
103. SCHLERETH, supra note 51, at 260,261 ("Church membership and attendance increased 
steadily from 1870 to 1920 .... American Protestants, led by the Methodists, Baptists, Presby-
terians, and the Disciples of Christ, acted as a semiofficial American religious establishment-a 
fairly unified coalition .... Together they formed ... a 'righteous empire' of local congregations 
and evangelical agencies."); see also PALLISTER, supra note 100, at 292 (noting apparent incon-
sistency between the erstwhile popularity oflace and "Puritan simplicity"). 
104. [d. at 121. 
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It was primarily women who "curated these collections [of home goods], 
as well as other parlor artifacts.,,105 Middle-class men, by contrast, were gener-
ally expected to show "restraint"-if not a complete lack of interest-in these 
components of the domestic sphere. 106 Designed objects were thus well posi-
tioned to serve as another important locus for the convergence of "political, 
economic, religious, social, and aesthetic ideologies" in the late nineteenth 
century. 107 
As lavish decoration in dress,108 personal accessories,109 and objects deco-
rating home interiors 110 became available to larger swaths of American so-
ciety, the variety and volume of objections to "ostentatious display" grew cor-
respondingly.llI By the final decades of the nineteenth century, middle- and 
upper-class white Americans displaying an affinity for the "ornamental" were 
vulnerable to accusations of immorality-whether because of the purportedly 
self-glorifying, frivolous, or "effeminate" nature of such ornament, or (by the 
l890s, for reasons discussed below) through an emergent symbolic association 
with so-called sexual "deviants.,,112 
105. SCHLERETH, supra note 51, at 119. 
106. BEDERMAN, supra note 63, at 13. One such specimen is provided in Figure 4. Note not 
only the differences in dress among the family members in this 1889 photograph, but also the 
father's distinct-and quite possibly affected-lack of interest in his physical surroundings. 
107. KUCHTA, supra note 96, at 4. See also SENNETT, supra note 61, at 166-67 nIn the 
latter half of the Nineteenth Century,] inanimate objects which surrounded [a] person could in 
their details be suggestive in such a way that the human being using or seeing them felt personally 
compromised. Some readers may remember the piano-leg covers in their grandfather's homes, or 
the dining-room table-leg covers; it was considered improper for the legs of anything to show .... 
All appearances have personal meanings: if you believe that little gestures with the eyes may 
involuntarily betray feeling of sexual license, it becomes equally rational to feel that the exposed 
legs of a piano are provocative . . . . [This type of] cultural change, leading to the covering of 
piano legs, has its roots in the very notion that all appearances speak, that human meanings are 
immanent in all phenomena."). 
108. The greater the proximity of decorative objects to the body, the closer the apparent 
correlation between these objects' intended consumers and the aesthetics of the feminine and the 
domestic; the cultural connotations varied accordingly in their power. See Foltyn, supra note 76, at 
323. ("According to [JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 50-51 (1972)], a long tradition exists of 
painting woman looking at herself in a mirror, joining the spectators of herself. The mirror is a 
symbol of the beautiful woman's vanity, of her conniving in treating herself as 'first and foremost, 
a sight. "'); WILSON, supra note 88, at 123 ("The dress of the nineteenth-century virgin on the 
marriage market had ... to convey family status as well as personal desirability .... This ide-
ology extended beyond dress to the home in which the woman reigned. Appearance became more 
and more mixed up with identity. It was the beginnings of the idea of the Self as a Work of Art, 
the 'personality' as something that extended to dress, scent and surroundings, all of which made 
an essential contribution to the formation of 'self' -at least for women."). 
109. RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND 
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 125 et seq. (2013). 
110. See SCHLERETH, supra note 51, at 121. 
111. See CLAYSON, supra note 67, at 79 ("Not every shopper was improper but a marked 
enthusiasm for shopping-synonymous with vanity-on the part of an otherwise respectable 
woman suggested a dubious character and an exaggerated and unhealthy concern for her own 
personal appearance, which in tum suggested her attempt at sexual attractiveness."). 
112. See SENNETT, supra note 61, at 190 ("The physical appearance of women emancipating 
themselves from sexual roles and the physical appearance of women trying to make themselves 
more sexual led to the same end: they appeared to others to be engaging in illicit activity."). See 
also id. ("In the 1890s makeup was being mass-produced and discreetly advertised in women's 
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III. AESTHETICISM, OSCAR WILDE, AND 
THE POPULAR ELISION OF DECORATIVE DESIGN 
AND "DEVIANT" SEXUALITY 
The declarations and endeavors of the so-called "New Woman," who en-
joyed education, occupational skills, and disposable income for aesthetic nov-
elties from fashionable dress to parlor curiosities, provoked anxiety among a 
large swath of late-nineteenth-century American society-especially men. 113 
In the l890s, dramatic, unanticipated developments in the realm of gender and 
sexuality further contributed to the perception among many that the funda-
mental structure of society-which, of course, largely corresponded with "the 
system of patriarchy" -was "under attack." 114 
The final twenty years of the nineteenth century witnessed the emerging 
scientific and popular awareness of the "homosexual," or "invert." 115 With 
unprecedented clarity, beginning in the l880s, 116 the notion of "effeminacy" 
became increasingly linked with an innately "deviant" sexuality among certain 
men. 117 The scientific "discovery" of homosexuality supplanted the popular 
magazines. What is correct is that using such devices to make the body attractive seemed [sic] like 
the woman was committing some kind of crime."). 
113. See BEDERMAN, supra note 63, at 13-14; SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 8-11. 
114. See SPENCER, supra note 71, at 196 CSodomites were reviled [in part because they] 
struck at the new driving force within society which brought comfort and security to the masses 
and helped them to rise above thousands of years of abject poverty. The sodomite could not pro-
create in his sexual act and his sterility also affected his role in the new consumer society."). 
115. See George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the 
Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance, 58-59 SALMAGUNDI 114, 114 (1982) (dis-
cussing the emergence of the tenn "homosexual"); Cohen, supra note 72, at 108 nIn Sigmund 
Freud's 1905 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,] he highlights what he perceives as the 
problems with earlier sexological discussions of male inversion produced by Ulrichs and Krafft-
Ebing which (like [John Addington] Symonds) he lumps together as roughly asserting that 'male 
inverts [possess] a feminine brain in a masculine body' .... "); Kevin Floyd, Making History: 
Marxism, Queer Theory, and Contradiction in the Future of American Studies, 40 CULTURAL 
CRITIQUE [THE FuTURE OF AMERICAN STUDIES] 167, 174 (Autumn 1998) CThe trope of gender 
'inversion,' which registered increasing and unmistakable contradictions in sexual ideology in the 
residual terms of the Victorian logic of gender, emerged relatively early in [the previously de-
scribed] process. This trope took the form, for example, of the widespread assumption that men 
who love other men are in some fundamental (e.g., biological or spiritual) sense feminized objects 
.... "). 
116. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 14 CThe concept of homosexuality began to take 
shape in the 1880s in the work of John Addington Symonds, Richard von Krafft-Ebing and in the 
research of Victorian sexologists such as Havelock Ellis."). See also Laura Doan & Chris Waters, 
Introduction to Part II, Homosexualities, in SEXOLOGY UNCENSORED: THE DOCUMENTS OF 
SEXUAL SCIENCE 41-42 (Lucy Bland & Laura Doan, eds., 1998) CThe early work of sexologists 
gradually began to familiarize the European and North American public with the existence of a 
new species of being variously labeled the Urning, Uranian, intermediate type, invert or homo-
sexual .... By the time the sensational trials of Oscar Wilde took place in 1895, male homosex-
uality was extensively debated, and its various manifestations and etiology subject to intensive 
scrntiny."). See also Cohen, supra note 72, at 86 (noting "first psychoanalytic theorization of male 
homosexuality" in Freud's publications of 1905). 
117. See Doan & Waters, supra note 116, at 41 CIn the late nineteenth century a series of 
distinct 'scientific,' clinical and discursive practices established a new taxonomy of 'deviant' 
sexual behaviour predicated upon the presumed existence of a nonnative heterosexuality. 'Sexual 
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understanding of "sodomy" as an episodic moral failing I 18 with the notion of a 
"pathology, even a disease" that warped the "degenerate's" body and mind. 119 
A pressing question, of course, was how to ascertain whether someone 
was an "invert." Given this terminology, it is unsurprising that it "was widely 
assumed that a man who felt sexual desire for another man must be in some 
way female and that the signs of his femininity could be detected." 120 Such 
reasoning opened the door to even more intense scrutiny of individuals' aes-
thetic choices than had occurred earlier in the century-which meant that eve-
rything from one's dress to one's style of writing was potential evidence of the 
"hotchpotch of moral, mental, and physical traits" that lurked behind the (more 
or less effective) "disguises" employed by the male homosexual. 121 
The most readily available suspects among men 122 were the fashion- and 
design-obsessed figures of the "dandy" and the "Aesthete."123 Each had long 
been linked in the Anglo-American imagination with "effeminacy," 124 and 
inversion' was initially the umbrella term for any activity that deviated from this norm; however, 
by the early twentieth century, the phrase became synonymous with homosexuality .... "). 
118. See SINFIELD, supra note 56, at 99 (previously, morality and law had targeted not a 
certain type of person but a certain type of sexual act). 
119. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 107 (on Freud's exploration, and rejection, of "theories 
that ascribe[d] 'the nature of inversion' to 'degeneracy' or 'illJate character"'). See also GEORGE 
CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE 
WORLD, 1890--1940, at 26-27 (1994). 
120. GRAHAM ROBB, STRANGERS: HOMOSEXUAL LOVE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 44 
(2004). 
121. [d. at 45. See also Magnus Hirschfeld, Transvestites, in SEXOLOGY UNCENSORED: THE 
DOCUMENTS OF SEXUAL SCIENCE, supra note 116, at 97, 99 (excerpt of Hirshfeld's 1910 essay 
showing how adoption of feminine accoutrements had become pathologized by "scientists" and 
other "intellectuals" by the early twentieth century). 
122. While this article focuses primarily on male homosexuality, a separate literature and 
conventional wisdom developed concerning his female counterpart. Notably, the "New Woman" 
was often accused not only of "degeneracy," but of lesbianism as well. ANGUS MCCLAREN, THE 
TRIALS OF MASCULINITY 32 (1997). For many, the male homosexual and the New Woman were 
effectively "mirrors" of each other. See Franz Meier, Oscar Wilde and the Myth of the Femme 
Fatale in Fin-de-Siecle Culture, in THE IMpORTANCE OF REINVENTING OSCAR: VERSIONS OF 
WILDE DURING THE LAST 100 YEARS 117, 119 (Uwe Boker et al. eds., 2002). 
123. See SUSAN B. KAISER, FASHION AND CULTURAL STUDIES 119-20 (2013); MCCLAREN, 
supra note 122, at 29,190. 
124. See SINFIELD, supra note 56, at 25-26 ("Effeminacy is founded in misogyny. Certain 
manners and behaviors are stigmatized by associating them with 'the feminine'-which is per-
ceived as weak, ineffectual and unsuited for the world of affairs. The terms were set by Aristotle 
who, in his discussion of continence and incontinence, opposes endurance and softness. 'Now the 
man who is defective in respect of resistance to the things which most men both resist and resist 
successfully is soft and effeminate; for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a man trails his 
clock to avoid the pain of lifting it. The connotations in the Oxford English Dictionary are: 'Wom-
anish, unmanly, enervated, feeble; self-indulgent, voluptuous; unbecomingly delicate or over-
refined' (OED). The root idea is a male falling away from the purposeful reasonableness that is 
supposed to constitute manliness, into the laxity and weakness conventionally attributed to 
women. It is a way of stigmatizing deviation from proper manly and womanly stereotypes. The 
effeminate male is (1) 'wrong' and (2) inferior (female). The 'masculine' woman, conversely, is 
(1) 'wrong' and (2) impertinent (aspiring to manliness. The function of effeminacy, as a concept is 
to police sexual categories keeping them pure. The effects of such policing extend vastly beyond 
lesbians and gay men. As various recent commentators have shown, the whole order of sexuality 
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even with potential acts of "sodomy," but had not been widely associated with 
homosexuality as a more permanent and dangerous biological phenomenon. 125 
However, when scientific discourse on "sexual inversion" made its way into 
the popular American consciousness in the 1880s, the dandy, the aesthete, and 
the homosexual would effectively merge-due in no small part to the personas 
of famous individuals displaying traits supposedly common to each category. 
Such individuals could be readily found among the leaders of the well-
known 1880s art-appreciation advocacy movement known as "Aestheticism." 
Because the figures associated with Aestheticism constitute a crucial link in 
the connotative cluster stigmatizing design (and, by association, design pa-
tents), it is necessary to discuss the ideology and its proponents in some detail. 
The overarching tenet of Aestheticism was "art for art's sake," the significance 
of which was to 
emphasize[] the autonomous value of art and regards preoccupations with 
morality, utility, realism and didacticism as irrelevant or inimical to artistic 
quality .... [The movement's] paintings therefore aimed at a decorative ef-
fect through composition and harmonious colour and frequently through the 
depiction of richly patterned surfaces and luxurious objects. 126 
The movement's leaders were essentially self-appointed experts who dis-
paraged what they considered to be insufficient appreciation among the public 
of the visual arrangement and effect of the elements of dress, interior design, 
and art. Aesthetes urged the Anglo-American public to make such decisions 
based solely on aesthetic considerations-a view that struck many as unor-
thodox, if not radical. After all, most middle- and upper-middle-class Ameri-
cans in East Coast cities had selected the objects decorating their parlors with 
objects "that depended on [recent] technological developments, ... ex-
press[ing] their sense of beauty and comfort in the styles of past times and 
places.,,127 Indeed, widespread social norms had for decades dictated that "ob-
jects on the parlor table," whatever their style, were appropriate only to the 
and gender is pinioned by the fears and excitements that gather around the allegedly inappropriate 
distribution of gender categories."). 
125. See SINFIELD, supra note 56 at 27 CUp to the time of the Wilde trials-far later than is 
widely supposed-it is unsafe to interpret effeminacy as defining of, or a signal of, same-sex 
passion.") Consider this description of the sort of men who favored the use of cologne, published 
in 1830: "A man that is wrapped up in perfumes is surely a pitiable creature. This fashion which 
was once disgustingly prevalent, is now confined, in a great measure, to persons of vulgar and 
mean habits, who are not only heedless of their religious obligations, but ignorant of the customs 
of good society. Still, however, the folly is not wholly banished from even the better informed 
classes of mankind; and it is a hideous cruelty, that a gentleman of moderate fortune will keep in 
his desk, for the purpose of perfuming note-paper, a vial of perfume, the price of which would pay 
the house-rent of a poor peasant, in our provinces for a whole year." THE AUTHOR OF "THE 
COLLEGIANS," & C. [I.E., GERALD GRIFFIN], TALES ILLUSTRATNE OF THE FIVE SENSES THEIR 
MECHANISM, USES AND GoVERNMENT, WITH MORAL AND EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTIONS 209 
(London, Edward Bull, 1830). Among the many flaws listed, a penchant for "unnatural" acts is 
(tellingly) absent in this early era. 
126. See Art for Art's Sake, OXFORD ART ONLINE, http://ezproxy.library.nyu.edu:21611 
subscriberiarticle/grove/artIT004365 (subscription required). 
127. See STEVENSON, supra note 50, at 4. 
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extent they "reflected the seriousness Victorians brought to their entertain-
ments."128 As "many advice book authors cautioned," parlors not conforming 
to conventional morality might "degenerate into scenes of 'cheap and vulgar' 
display." 129 Parlor decoration was appropriate only "if it had a serious pur-
pose" and did not evoke a "period known for its immorality.,,13o 
However, Aestheticism and other forces were beginning to change the 
status quo, as "changes in thought and the material world were beginning to 
dilute the emulsifying power of seriousness"; by the 1880s, ideological and 
commercial publications alike "showed readers how they could disavow the 
popular taste" through reflective approaches to their acquisition of material 
possessions.1 31 English designer and early Aesthete Charles Eastlake, for ex-
ample, received substantial notoriety for his widely circulated tracts calling for 
the public "to develop the artistic sense" in various ways. 132 He recommended 
"that people look for quality objects in all lands," as the "display of an Indian 
ginger jar or a Japanese fan could educate the eye by showing 'good design 
and skillful workmanship.'" 133 
Such exoticism carried many negative associations for many middle- and 
upper-middle-class Americans of the time period. 134 But perhaps more difficult 
for these individuals to accept was Eastlake's dictate that the public concern 
itself "with aestheticism [rather] than with Victorian-style seriousness." 135 
Eastlake "never mentioned serious purpose" because "to him, an appreciation 
of art was good in itself." 136 And the Aesthetes' conception of "art" was broad, 
indeed: "The term 'art' was self-consciously prefixed to ranges of furniture, 
pottery, and other household goods influenced by Aesthetic ideals, blurring 
distinctions between the fine arts and decorative arts"; "furniture, carpets, wall 
128. Id. at 13. 
129. Id. at 4. 
130.Id. at 5, 7. 
131. Id. at 25, 26. 
132. Id. at 26. 
133. See discussion SCHLERETH, supra note 51, at 123. 
134. STEVENSON, supra note 50, at 26 (reciting one critic's denouncing of homes he de-
scribed as "shrines cluttered with French and German miracles of ugliness."). The reference to 
"French and German" ugliness is notable for various reasons. More "exotic," non-Western objects 
and design motifs typically found their way to the United States through countries like France and 
Germany, as did much pornography of the day. See id. at 15 ("No U.S. trade catalog offered sug-
gestive or sexually teasing stereographs, but they were available on the street-most often im-
ported from France and Germany for clandestine purpose."). This dovetails with other stigmatized 
aspects of continental culture. See, e.g., PALLISTER, supra note 100, at 375-76 ("The entry of all 
foreign laces [into England] was excluded by law. '400,000 [pounds] have been sent out of the 
country during the last year,' writes the 'Edinburgh Advertiser' of 1764, 'to support our exiled 
countrymen in France, where they learn nothing but folly and extravagance. "'). Popular con-
demnation of foreign people and customs would take a sinister turn in the decades to come, as the 
U.S. economy and political landscape experienced turbulence that many sought to blame on im-
migration, see BEDERMAN, supra note 63, at 13, and public discourse on "nationalism" and "state-
craft" became increasingly intertwined with xenophobic strains of eugenic thought. See Carolyn 
Burdett, Introduction to Part VI, Eugenics, in SEXOLOGY UNCENSORED: THE DOCUMENTS OF 
SEXUAL SCIENCE, supra note 116, at 165, 1 65---Q7. 
135. STEVENSON, supra note 50, at 26-27. 
136. Id. at 26-27. 
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coverings, pictures, and decorative items [should be] placed deliberately to 
enshrine the 'cult of beauty. ",137 
Oscar Wilde was often described as "the supreme aesthete.,,138 He would 
become associated on both sides of the Atlantic with (initially) a distinct phi-
losophy on dress and design and (subsequently) a scandalous sexual deviance 
that would indelibly stamp the "decorative arts" with the stigma of "moral 
decay," "degeneracy," and "perversion." Wilde achieved great fame in the 
United States during his 140-stop North American lecture tour in 1882, adver-
tised as a campaign for the promotion of Aestheticism. 139 The popular percep-
tion of his mission is reflected in the headlines of articles announcing his 
arrival in major East Coast cities, which include "The Aesthetic Bard" (Phil-
adelphia Inquirer), "The Science of the Beautiful" (New York World), and 
"The Aesthetic Apostle" (Boston Globe).140 
This journalistic coverage of Wilde's American speaking tour reveals 
widespread discussion-and even controversy---concerning the "supreme aes-
thete's" unconventionally colorful and dramatic manner of dress and taste in 
decor. 141 As social theorist Richard Sennett recounts: "When people com-
mented on Oscar Wilde's tastes in scarves and cravats, in the years before his 
homosexuality trial, they were wont to acknowledge his individuality and at 
the same time to remark that such tastes were a clear definition of how the 
ordinary gentleman ought not to appear." 142 
137. Pat Kirkham & Amy F. Ogata, Europe 1830-1900, in HISTORY OF DESIGN: 
DECORATNE ARTS AND MATERIAL CULTURE, 1400-2000, at 430 (Pat Kirkham & Susan Weber, 
eds.,2013). 
138. See id. at 431; MICHAEL KANE, MODERN MEN: MAPPING MASCULINITY IN ENGLISH 
AND GERMAN LITERATURE, 1880-1930, at 74 (1999) (on "supreme aesthete" moniker). 
139. Roy MORRIs, JR., DECLARING HIS GENIUS: OSCAR WILDE IN NORTH AMERICA 2-3 
(2013) (describing Wilde's existing fame throughout North America when the celebrity writer 
arrived for his 140-1ecture speaking tour in 1882, as well as their new "vision of [Wilde's] inten-
tionally affected preciosity in satin knee breeches. ."); OSCAR WILDE IN AMERICA: THE 
INTERVIEWS 86 (Matthew Hofer & Gary Scharnhorst eds., 2010). 
140. See OSCAR WILDE IN AMERICA: THE INTERVIEWS, supra note 139, at 22, 31, 47. 
141. See id. at 83, 88. 
142. SENNETT, supra note 61, at 191. 
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Figure 5. Napoleon Sarony, Oscar Wilde (1882) [cropped for fit] 
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To be sure, Eastlake and Wilde were not the only "Aesthetes," nor were 
all Aesthetes from across the Atlantic. One prominent American-born Aes-
thete, for example, was Edward "Ned" Warren, the younger brother of promi-
nent Boston lawyer Samuel Warren (whose firm partner was future Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis.) The Warren family's biographer writes: "The 
1870s and 1880s were a time when 'aestheticism' was an issue for everyone, 
and one that affected more than one's experience of art and beauty. [In the 
United States, Ned Warren] was a figure in the aesthetic movement, indeed 
deserves to be considered one of its key examples." 143 The biographer goes on 
to assert, notably, that Ned Warren "illustrates a philistine cliche of the times, 
that Catholicism, aestheticism, paganism, and homosexuality were interde-
pendent." 144 
Aesthetes like Wilde and Warren were the target of jokes (and their sex-
ual proclivities the subject of speculation) even before Wilde was tried and 
convicted of "gross indecency" in England in the mid-1890s. 145 As art 
historians Pat Kirkham and Amy Ogata have recounted, even before the trials, 
the press had often "lampooned [Aesthetes] for an excessive and effeminate 
concern with taste and home decoration, self-absorption at the expense of 
wider issues, and associations with decadence." 146 
143. MARTIN BURGESS GREEN, THE MOUNT VERNON STREET WARRENS: A BOSTON STORY, 
1860-1910, at 49 (1989). 
144. [d. at 49. See also id. at 72 ("[While at HalVard, Ned's] chief desire was to get into the 
Porcellian Club, because Sam [his brother, the law-firm partner of future Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis] had done so; but Ned was an unlikely candidate because of his eccen-
tric[ities]. ... ('Ned was known for his neckties.')"). 
145. Thomas Prasch, Clashing Greeks and Victorian Culture Wars: Euripides vs. 
Aristophanes in Late-Victorian Discourse, 54 VICTORIAN STUDIES 464, 467 (2012) C[I]n 1894, 
before Wilde's arrest and trials, he was at the height of his fame .... [TJhe homosexual 'panic' 
... was already beginning to operate before Wilde's arrests . .. with male homosexuality firmly 
coalescing into an image of the decadent aristocrat. . .") (emphasis added); accord Rosy 
AINDOW, DRESS AND IDENTITY IN BRITISH LITERARY CULTURE, 1870--1914, 60 (2010) CWhere 
men do appear in [elaborate] fashions in the late nineteenth century, they are critiqued for being 
effeminate.") Wilde was technically charged only with "indecency," carrying a two-year prison 
sentence (perhaps because of problems obtaining proof of "sodomy," which carried a penalty of 
lifetime imprisonment.) However, the widespread understanding that he had effectively been 
accused of homosexual conduct is reflected in commentary both during and after the trial. See, 
e.g., CHARLES GROLLEAU, THE TRIAL OF OSCAR WILDE 13-14 (1906) COscar Wilde, bon vivant, 
man of letters, arbiter of literary fashion, stood at the bar of public opinion, a wretch guilty of 
crimes against which the body recoils and the mind revolts."). 
146. Kirkham & Ogata, supra note 137, at 429-31. See also WILSON, supra note 88, at 6 
CTo [act] fashionably is both to stand out and to merge with the crowd, to lay claim to the exclu-
sive and to follow the herd .... [D]espite its apparent irrationality, fashion cements social soli-
darity and imposes group norms, while deviations in dress are usually experienced as shocking 
and disturbing."). 
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Figure 6. George Du Maurier, An Infelicitous Question (1890) 
Not until Wilde's 1895 internationally followed trials, however, did "male 
homosexuality firmly coalesc[ e] into an image of the decadent aristocrat 
.... ,,147 It was through the Wilde trials that the "homosexual undercurrent of 
the Aesthetic Movement was cruelly exposed.,,148 This linking of Wilde's pro-
fessional, artistic, and sexual undertakings was a major driving force in the 
formation, in the middle-class-centered Anglo-American consciousness, of a 
perceived "nexus of effeminacy, leisure, idleness, immorality, luxury, insouci-
ance, decadence and aestheticism." 149 
Men's aesthetic affinities and their sexual proclivities were henceforth 
linked in the public imagination. With surprising speed and rhetorical vigor, 
the values held dear by the Aestheticism movement-in broad strokes, an ap-
preciation of the beauty of everyday design-were rebuked. ISO One commen-
tator, publishing in 1906 a cautionary tale-cum-amateur psychological analysis 
of Wilde, drew an explicit connection between the playwright's penchant for 
the unusual in apparel and decoration, his vanity, and his "wretched" sexu-
ality.ISI Wilde's love of novelty served as a metaphor for his popularly imag-
ined physical, moral, and spiritual "disease.,,152 His "pin[ing] for strange pas-
147. Prasch, supra note 145, at 467. 
148. See ROBB, supra note 120, at 36. 
149. SINFIELD, supra note 51, at 3. 
150. See Kirkham & Ogata, supra note 137, at 429-31 (appreciation of design "lost much of 
its fashionability in the mid-1890s with the sensationalist media coverage of Wilde's trial for gross 
indecency, in which he was found guilty"). 
151. GROLLEAU, supra note 145, at xii. 
152. See id. at 5. 
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sions, new sensations" purportedly reflected the "whole awful truth" -that 
"[p ]erverted passions consumed the fire of his being." 153 
Even before Wilde's prosecution in 1895, few city-dwelling adults on the 
East Coast of the United States had been unfamiliar with "the supreme aes-
thete's" tastes, artistic philosophies, and flamboyant persona. 154 After 1895, 
large segments of the American public quite easily "mapped" ISS Wilde's "de-
pravity" of body and spirit onto the aesthetic and types of designed objects 
already associated with him. 156 As Regenia Gagnier writes: 
In Wilde's trials in 1895, his perceived position as both spokesperson for art 
and example of sexual deviant resulted in a remarkable elision in the public 
domain of art and sexuality and thus in the creation of a new category of aes-
theticism .... As his works were given equal time with his sexual practices 
during the trials, aestheticism came to represent a distinct and private realm 
of art and sexuality .... Thus aestheticism came to mean the irrational in 
both productive (art) and reproductive (sexuality) realms: an indication of the 
art world's divorce from middle-class life. 157 
153. [d. at 5. 
Rumour had been busy with the name of Oscar Wilde for a long time before the whole awful truth 
became known .... But even those who were still proud to rank him among their friends did know 
not how far he had wilfully drawn himself into the web of disgrace. Much that seemed strange and 
unaccountable was attributed to his well-known love of pose. Men shrugged their shoulders and de-
clared that 'Wilde meant no harm.'. .. Men of such parts could not be judged by ordinary stand-
ards. 
[d. at 6-7. 
154. See Prasch, supra note 145, at 467. 
155. See RUSSETT, supra note 29, at 5-6, 7 ("Finding 'manifestations of a universal law' had 
become 'the intellectual pastime of the nineteenth century.' Reformers and conservatives alike 
searched for a new foundation for social and political action in the face of the weakening of reli-
gious belief and the growth of social unrest .... Anatomists, physiologists, and psychologists 
grew increasingly concerned to classify individuals according to types with sharply differing con-
stitutions and aptitudes."). See also MCCLAREN, supra note 122, at 29-31 (discussing turn-of-the-
century public paranoia concerning the figure of the male homosexual as "both the cause and 
effect of the growing fear of the male 'other"'). 
156. See generally GROLLEAU, supra note 145 (retroactively "feminizing" the artistic crea-
tions of Oscar Wilde in book providing inaccurate and incomplete account of the trial it purports 
to recount); cf Loos, supra note 94, at 22 (,,[Olrnament is no longer a natural product of our 
culture, so that it is a phenomenon either of backwardness or degeneration . . . . [Tlhe modern 
ornamentalist is a straggler or a pathological phenomenon."). 
157. REGENIA GAGNIER, IDYLLS OF THE MARKETPLACE: OSCAR WILDE AND THE 
VICTORIAN PUBLIC 139 (1987). 
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Figure 7. Oscar the Apostle. 
Puck's "Wilde" Dream of an Aesthetic Future for America (1882) 
In this manner, the prevailing connotative cluster surrounding ornament 
and decoration, championed by Aestheticism and Wilde in particular, deci-
sively expanded in mid-1890s America to include "moral decay" and "perver-
sion.,,158 Both perceived homosexuals and the activities and objects159 associ-
158. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 150 (quoting letter from Romain Rolland to Richard 
Strauss) COscar Wilde's Salome is not worthy of you. Wilde's Salome and all who surround her, 
save only that brute of a Jochanan, are unhealthy, unclean, hysterical or alcoholic, oozing with a 
perfumed and mundane corruption. ."); Ruth Robbins, "A Very Curious Construction": 
Masculinity and the Poetry of A. E. Housman and Oscar Wilde, in CULTURAL POLITICS AT THE 
FIN DE SIEcLE 137, 146 (Sally Ledger & Scott McCracken eds., 1995) CWilde did dare to speak 
the name of sexual pleasure [in his works], and got away with it until the point where the word and 
the deed were 'proved' by a court of law to be intimately connected.") (internal citations omitted). 
159. DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 83, at xxiv CSociallife is a matter of aliguments, 
for and against, and for signaling alignments goods are like flags .... It turns out that everything 
depends on how the people are organized, the whole community being the signal box.") 
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ated with them were henceforth160 subjected to aesthetic surveillance and legal 
consequences. 161 Any man who, like Wilde, 162 evinced an appreciation for 
"phatic" 163 forms of beauty---especially decoration,164 adornment,165 and orna-
mentation,166 especially in dress, items of home decor, and related objects and 
materials 167_might be condemned and persecuted as a "deviant." 
160. See Robbins, supra note 158, at 137 CWilde's trial may be understood as the end of an 
era"). See also ROBB, supra note 120, at 39 (,,[Conventional notions about homosexuality] have 
little to tell us about the Victorian age. They belong, not to the maligned 19th century, but to the 
more openly repressive age that began with the death of Oscar Wilde in 1900."). 
161. See SHOWALTER, supra note 51, at 3 (quoting RICHARD DELLAMORE, MASCULINE 
DESIRE 133 (1990)) (men in power responded to this "crisis of masculinity" in part by seizing 
"occasions when gender roles [could be] 'publicly, even spectacularly, encoded and enforced."'; 
see also Robbins, supra note 158, at 138 CThe fear of an ending aroused by the term fin de si(xle 
is intimately related to notions of multiplicity: above all the fear that the anarchy of multiple inter-
pretations will replace the safety of one view of the world. The events of 1895 were of crucial 
importance here. Wilde's downfall dramatized the conflict between those who were prepared to 
live at the margins, to live simultaneously several different versions of life, and those who wished 
to use the full ideological weight of church and state to enforce nineteenth-century sexual norms."). 
162. See Yvette Gresh~, Strategies of Veiling Same-Sex Desire and Its Public Consumption: 
Aubrey Beardsley's Illustration of Oscar Wilde's 1894 Salome, 70 DE ARTE 22, 35 
C[P]erceptions of Wilde as a homosexual archetype are so pervasive that almost any interpretation 
of his work invites the scholar to confront the issues surrounding the construction of this identity. 
Wilde's trials took place at a particularly significant moment for constructs of male same-sex 
identity. Historians working within Foucauldian and feminist frameworks perceive the late nine-
teenth century as a period crucial for the definition and conceptualisation of male same-sex 
practices. They argue that burgeoning scientific, legal, social, cultural and popular discourses 
attempted to define and categorise sexual behaviour and roles around what was perceived to be 
appropriate and normal. The canon was heterosexual reproductive intercourse constituted as 'nor-
mal' and 'natural' and validated because of its procreative function. Within this canon a binary 
was established within the hegemonic infrastructure which constructed men as the superior sex 
intellectually, morally, socially, politically and physically. In the last two decades of the nine-
teenth centUJY the emergence of the categories 'New Woman' and 'homosexual' explicitly threat-
ened to dismpt the cohesiveness of this binary.") 
163. See Robbins, supra note 158, at 143 (explaining that "for Wilde, 'all art is essentially 
useless'" -and that based on the mores of the time, "an effeminate use of language would be one 
which preferred the phatic to the functiona1."). 
164. SINFIELD, supra note 56, at 41. 
165. See Georg Simmel, Adornment, in THE RISE OF FASHION 79, 81 (Daniel Leonhard 
Purdy ed., 2004) (purporting to explain sociological basis for the greater use of adornment, spe-
cifically in the form of jewelry, among women than men). 
166. See Loos, supra note 94, at 22 C[T]he modern ornamentalist is a straggler or a patho-
logical phenomenon."). 
167. See ELIZABETHE. GUFFEY, RETRO: THE CULTURE OF REVIVAL 34 (2006) nn Britain, 
the [flowery Art Nouveau] style was increasingly associated with aestheticism and particularly 
with Oscar Wilde, who had been imprisoned for homosexuality in 1895. 'Pillory, L' Art Nouveau 
at South Kensington,' an article published in 1901 in the Architectural Review, dubbed the style a 
'fantastic malady.' Interviewed in a Magazine of Art article in 1904, architect Charles Voysey 
identified Art Nouveau with 'a debauch of sensuous feeling,' calling the style 'distinctly unhealthy 
and revolting.' By 1930 the American historian Lewis Mumford recalled Art Nouveau as domi-
nated by a 'meaningless stylistic exuberance.' When John Betjeman surveyed the style in the same 
year he admitted that it had produced 'many a hideous little side table, many a sickly front 
door."'); see also Gresh~, supra note 162, at 34 CIt is significant that, at the time of Wilde's trials, 
[famous Art Nouveau illustrator Aubrey] Beardsley and Wilde were conflated in the popular imag-
ination. ."); TREASURY OF ART NOUVEAU DESIGN & ORNAMENT (Dover 1980) (illustrations 
selected by Carol Belanger Grafton) COrnament is the essence of Art Nouveau," which "concen-
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Figure 8. List of Oscar Wilde's Belongings for Auction (1895) 
trated on the ornamental and decorative potential of the flowing line in painting, printing, wall-
paper, and [other] applied arts. Hundreds of thousands of carefully wrought designs embellished 
books, bookplates, furniture, and appliances." (quoted from the publisher's description on the back 
cover». While the associations among Wilde, Aestheticism, and ornament gave rise to rapid 
changes in the normative contours of Anglo-American masculinity, they did not immediately 
affect the output of the designed domestic goods, which were purchased primarily by women, a 
group far less vulnerable to the sexuality-focused scrutiny of the post -1895 era. Further, one 
would not expect to see Art Nouveau's stigma exerting a strong influence outside the realm of the 
"decorative arts"-for example, in material covered by copyright law, as opposed to design-patent 
law-as "the impact of Art Nouveau on the fine arts was ambiguous and often only peripheral." 
ALASTAIR DUNCAN, ART NOUVEAU 79 (1994). This is because Art Nouveau "was largely a way 
of designing, rather than painting per se, and was therefore more readily expressed by plastic 
treatment" than on flat surfaces like canvas. [d. 
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Figure 9. Closing Scene at the Old Bailey: Trial of Oscar Wilde (1895) 
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In short, by the tum of the twentieth century, ornament, appearance, aes-
thetics, morality, gender, sexuality, health, and social order had grown inex-
tricably intertwined in the cultural imagination of the politically dominant seg-
ments of American society. At that point, it strnck many members of society 
as appropriate, if not imperative, for the law to step in-and it did, employing 
various tools to acknowledge and endorse values aligned with this newly crys-
tallized connotative cluster. Among those tools, we will see, was design-patent 
doctrine, as litigation over decorative and ornamental design provided both a 
cognitive lens and a public platform for judges to implement prevailing social 
norms through their adjudication of disputes over material carrying enormous 
symbolic power. 168 
IV. FEDERAL JUDGES AND GENDERED 
NOTIONS OF MORALITY 
Judges, no less than laypeople, are susceptible to the conceptual structures 
and social norms governing most aspects of our day-to-day reasoning and be-
havior. 169 Indeed, the members of the judiciary preserve their institutional le-
gitimacy in part by implementing prevailing norms and values through their 
rnlings. 170 As Cass Sunstein explains, judicial decisions invariably reflect bi-
ases mediating the interpretation and application of legal "rnles": 
168. See De Grazia, supra note 13, at 4 (,,[The period in question witnessed] the transfor-
mation of goods from being relatively static symbols around which hierarchies were ordered to 
being more directly constitutive of class, social status, and personal identity .... [G]ender roles 
have inflected this dynamic of change and have been significantly inflected by it."); Robbins, 
supra note 158, at 137 ("[When addressing] cultural boundaries and their enforcement in binary 
oppositions [at the fin de siecle,] masculinity [is an appropriate] focus, because masculinity's 
dominant ideological position means that the boundaries which define it are most in need of po-
licing."). See also De Grazia, supra note 13, at 9 (,,[There has long been] a bias in Anglo-
American studies that consumption is generally construed as individual rather than social, to the 
neglect of the numerous ways in which ruling institutions define practices and standards of con-
sumption [as when] they define appropriate standards of consumption with statistics and property 
laws .... Indeed, it could be said that the state, in the process of allocating resources, legitimating 
property, and defining social obligations, establishes the very notion of private as opposed to 
public consumption. By the same token, the state is central to the activity of gendering consump-
tion."). 
169. See WINTER, supra note 23; Hutchinson & Cohen, supra note 18, at 21-22. To be sure, 
there are certain widespread conventions in the American legal system that could potentially pre-
clude a "perfect mapping" of social and cultural circumstances onto judicial behavior-the institu-
tional practice of stare decisis being the most obvious example of an intervening-cum-deflecting 
mechanism. However, the real-life impact of such constraints may-and, as shown below, do-
vary wildly. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2, 12 (2012) ("How much uncertainty [remains despite the convention of stare 
decisis-how much damage it does to the basis of predictability-is a matter of degree and de-
pends on all sorts of surrounding circumstances .... "). 
170. See discussion MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK 46 (1986) (theorizing 
behavior of "legitimating individuals" within institutions, including 'Judges," based on view that 
"most established institutions, if challenged, are able to rest their claims to legitimacy on their fit 
with the nature of the universe."). 
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We might be tempted to suppose that people can avoid expressive concerns 
entirely and that it is possible to assess law solely on the basis of conse-
quences-that an open-ended, 'all things considered' inquiry into conse-
quences is a feasible way of evaluating legal rules. But this is not actually 
possible. The effects of any legal rule can be described in an infinite number 
of ways. Any particular characterization or accounting of consequences will 
rest not on some depiction of the brute facts; instead it will be mediated by a 
set of (often tacit) norms determining how to describe or conceive of conse-
171 quences. 
One way legal actors give effect to prevailing social norms is through the 
symbolic, metaphorical treatment of the subject matter in the disputes before 
them. 172 Such symbolism is effectuated through-and can be reconstructed 
through an examination of-word choice, thematic focus, and other rhetorical 
techniques. 173 Thus, as an affinity for design, particularly fashion(able) design, 
grew increasingly feminized and morally stigmatized in the mid-to-Iate nine-
teenth century, federal-court judges in major cities on the East Coast of the 
United States would take note and modify their personal and professional con-
duct accordingly. 174 
No white adult male of turn-of-the-century America was immune from the 
pressures exerted by the gendered connotative clusters discussed above; how-
ever, federal judges were under particular-and particularly visible-pressure 
to endorse and implement this value system. The educated and moneyed, espe-
cially in major East Coast cities like Boston and New York, were those most 
likely to be appointed to prestigious judgeships on the Supreme Court and the 
171. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2027, 
2044,2048 (1996). 
172. See discussion LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 115-16 ("[M]etaphor pervades 
our normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to use are 
either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need 
to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial 
orientations, objects, etc.) This need leads to metaphorical definitions in our conceptual system 
[and indeed, metaphor plays an 'extensive role'] in the way we function, the way we conceptualize 
our experience, and the way we speak. Most of [the relevant] evidence comes from language-
from the meanings of words and phrases and from the way humans make sense of their experi-
ences .... [Thus, h]ints of the existence of such general metaphors may be given in the secondary 
or tertiary senses of other words .... [Language thus provides] data that can lead to general prin-
ciples of understanding .... The principal issue for such an account of definition is what gets 
defined and what does the defining."). 
173. See Austin Sarat et aI., Introduction: On the Origins and Prospects of the Humanistic 
Study of Law, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 4 (Austin Sarat et ai. eds., 
2010) CLaw is a language and language matters. [It is] a rhetorical practice-not just in the sense 
of an art of persuasion, but of a disciplined, textured, self-directed habit of reading, speaking and 
above all, writing, that has at its root a critical understanding of the links among language, con-
sciousness, and power .... [In short, w]hat we say matters and is indissociably bound up with the 
forms in which we say it."). 
174. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Case Selection and Decisionmaking in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 443, 446 (1993) (,,[S]cholars have shown a strong relationship 
between the policy positions justices take in cases and external evidence of their preferences.") 
(internal citations omitted). 
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then-newly formed federal circuit courts of appeals. 175 These same individ-
uals' education and financial success rendered them more vulnerable to 
charges of "deviance" from championed middle-class values 176 -including, 
but not limited to, normative sexual practices-in part because of the strong 
class component of turn-of-the-century conceptions of masculinity. 177 
Judges' emphatic implementation of prevailing social norms both af-
firmed and perpetuated--Dr at least, conveyed that the performer was the sort 
of man who would make decisions most likely to perpetuate 178 -prevailing 
social norms and values, simultaneously maximizing the likelihood that the 
ruling(s) in question would preserve or even bolster the institutional legitimacy 
and apparent moral integrity of the federal judiciary. 179 While one might ini-
tially write off patents-and specifically, design patents-as an area of law in 
which gendered social norms and notions of sexual morality are unlikely to 
playa substantial role,180 a close study of federal appellate decisions will re-
veal the contrary. 
Design patents, like "utility" patents, were and are an exclusively federal 
matter, making the Supreme Court the (theoretical) court of last resort on 
questions of design-patent doctrine. Until roughly the turn of the century, the 
Court did play that role-until it effectively abdicated it to the Second Circuit, 
as discussed below. Thus, it makes sense to start with a portrait of the Justices 
175. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 306 et seq. (3d ed. 
2004) (noting that U.S. legal profession at the tnrn of the twentieth centnry was "stratified more by 
social class and training than along geographical lines"). 
176. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 119, at 60. 
177. MCCLAREN, supra note 122, at 29 (noting popular perception that much of the pur-
ported "erosion of the natnral gender boundaries was attributed to the 'decadence' of the upper 
classes"). 
178. See SINFIELD, supra note 56, at 63 nT]he more precarious the actnality, the more 
assertive the ideology; manliness was always fragile. 'Its existence,' William Acton wrote in 
1857, 'seems necessary to give a man that consciousness of his dignity, of his character as head 
and ruler, and of his importance, which is absolutely essential to the well-being of the family, and 
through it, society itself.' With so much hanging upon it, manliness was continually at issue.") 
(internal footnote omitted). 
179. This dynamic is especially pronounced in late nineteenth-century Supreme Court deci-
sions in which judges implicitly claimed the moral high ground through the vilification of legisla-
tures as immoral or derelict or both in their duties to the public. See, e.g., Boston Beer Co. v. State 
of Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877) ("Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the 
extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory 
definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health, 
and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals. The 
legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for these objects."); Boyd 
v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650 (1876) (Field, J.) (no legislative body can "restrain the power of a 
subsequent legislature to legislate for the public welfare, and to that end to suppress any and all 
practices tending to corrupt the public morals"). 
180. See discussion Charles Goodwin & Marjorie Harness Goodwin, Seeing as Situated 
Activity: Formulating Planes, in COGNITION AND COMMUNICATION AT WORK 61, 90 (Yrjo 
Engestrom & David Middleton eds., 1996) ("The mundane routine work of large organizations as 
strategic a site as rituals in traditional societies for the anthropological analysis of cultnre.") (inter-
nal citations omitted.); KUCHTA, supra note 96, at 9 ("Stndying masculinity in political cultnre . 
means looking at the ways in which political legitimacy [has been] defined in part by issues of 
character-by the personal integrity and manliness of those claiming a place in the political 
arena."). 
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who laid the foundational precedent of design-patent jurisprudence. Legal his-
torian Lawrence Friedman paints the following picture of the judges on the 
Supreme Court-similar in demographic respects and ideological inclinations 
to most federal judges: 
What sort of men sat on [the Supreme] Court? And the answer is: middle-
aged men, fairly conservative; churchgoing men who believed in traditional 
values and clean living; honorable men, according to their lights, men who 
worried about the fate of their country, and who were frightened of the tidal 
waves of social change that they saw washing over the United States. 181 
As Friedman recounts, when Justices at the turn-of-the-century upheld 
progressive economic legislation, it was where such laws "stood for decency 
and traditional values," including "family values, domesticity, and mother-
hood," and where such legislation represented a bulwark "against decay" and 
"vice."182 When the Court upheld a women's labor law in its 1908 decision in 
Muller v. Oregon, for example, the Justices reasoned-based in large part on 
their reliance on "widespread and long-continued belief' and "judicial cog-
nizance of all matters of general knowledge," that "woman has always been 
dependent on man," and that "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous off-
spring, the physical wellbeing of woman becomes an object of public interest 
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." 183 
Such statements were far more normative than descriptive; the Supreme 
Court in Muller was in fact painting a picture of a society that was rapidly dis-
appearing. Their stubbornly retrograde view of "the public good" was that of 
Justices who were, in Friedman's words, "terrified of radical winds blowing in 
from across the Atlantic.,,184 The members of the Court were a "soundly upper 
middle class" group, and "[w]hat they feared the most, it seems, was ex-
cess."185 
The Justices of the Supreme Court were not anomalous in this respect. 
Muller reflects an ideology "representative of [that held by judges] in both the 
state and federal courts that positioned the legal rights of individuals as a bar-
181. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 21-22 (2002) 
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY] (emphasis added). 
182. [d. at 22. 
183.208 U.S. 412 (1908). (These quotations are taken from various parts of Muller.) 
184. See FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 181, at 23. Judicial fear and stigmatizing of 
the "foreign" has been a recurring theme in American jurisprndence. For the notion of "falsity" 
associated with the Orient, see W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Worth Featherweight Pen Co., 41 F.2d 
820, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (Woolsey, J.) (referring to knockoff of popular pen as a "Chinese 
copy"). Consider also the 2003 Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, in which 
a majority of the Court struck down as unconstitutional a Texas "sodomy" prohibition insofar as it 
purported to regulate the private sexual conduct of consenting adults. Justice Scalia dissented 
vehemently, arguing (perhaps unaware of the longue duree of the relevant themes in Anglo-
American cultural history) that the Court "should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans." [d. at 598 (internal citation omitted). 
185. See FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 181, at 23. This fear likely stemmed in part 
from the traditional association between class, ornament, and decadence. See discussion supra Part II. 
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rier to efforts by state and federal government to promote the public good.,,186 
And, importantly, the degree of federal courts' "say" over the "public good" 
was broader than ever before, 187 encompassing the regulation of sexuality. 188 
(Indeed, even in the patent arena, federal judges saw no substantive or jurisdic-
tional obstacle to deciding cases in a manner that promoted "the morals, 
health, or good order of society."189) Friedman sums up the landscape by ex-
plaining that American federal judges of the turn-of-the-century "simply re-
acted [to the cases before them] in the way that respectable, moderate con-
servatives of their day would naturally react." 190 
This included policing the law, through their decisions, for the preserva-
tion of the "clean and wholesome," for any "motive dominating the legislature 
than the purpose to [serve] the public health or welfare," and for anything that 
would "pervert . .. the natural outcome of a dominant opinion" or otherwise 
controvert "traditions of our people and law."191 In many cases, it was simply 
"self-evident" -and not only to Supreme Court Justices 192 -that particular 
outcomes in disputes raising "moral" questions followed from "the nature of 
things.,,193 
186. TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, CITY OF EROS: NEW YORK CITY, PROSTITUTION, AND THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SEX, 1790-1920, at 308 (1992). For an interpretation of the Mann Act, 
see Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
187. See id. at 148-50 (developments in post-Civil War era reflected widespread "notion 
that the federal conrts conld intervene" in a broader range of cases than ever before). Cj MORTON 
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 1 (1977) CWhat dramati-
cally distinguished nineteenth century law from its eighteenth century counterpart from the extent 
to which common law judges came to play a central role in directing the source of social 
change."); id. at 2 CIt was as clear to laymen as it was to lawyers that the nature of American 
institutions, whether economic, social, or political, was largely to be determined by the judges. In 
such a period, questions of private law were seen and considered as questions of social policy. 
Indeed, judges gradually began to shape common law doctrine with an increasing awareness that 
the impact of a decision extended far beyond the case before them [and] .... were led to frame 
general doctrines based on a conscious consideration of social and economic policies.") 
188. See generally JESSICA R. PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE 
MAKING OF THE FBI (2015) (arguing that the Court's upholding of the Mann Act reinforced tradi-
tional conservative views of sex such as chastity before marriage for women and faithfulness for 
husbands and fathers). 
189. See Nat'l Automatic Device v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89,89-90 (N.D. Ill. 1889) ("[T]he machine 
in question is only used for gambling purposes. The law of the United States only authorizes the 
issue of a patent for a new and useful invention, and in an early case on that subject (Bedford v. 
Hunt, 1 Mason, 302) it was held that the word 'useful,' as used in this statute, means such an in-
vention as may be applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention 
which is injurious to the morals, health, or good order of society, and the principle thus enunciated 
has been uniformly applied ever since.") (emphasis added.); Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery 
Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925) (IP rights not enforced because product deemed deceptive). 
190. See FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 181, at 24. 
191. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905). See also GROLLEAU, supra note 145, at 
8 ("[Wilde] sought unnatural affection.") 
192. See, e.g., People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (Cowen, J.) ("[N]o 
court can overrule the law of human nature, which declares that one who has already started on the 
road of prostitution, would be less reluctant to pursue her way, than another who yet remains at 
her home of innocence and looks upon such a career with horror.") 
193. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1914) (emphasis added). Even Justice Holmes, in 
his 1918 critique of those he disparaged as "naive" proponents of "natural law," carved out certain 
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Thus, male judges of the time, making use of the substantial moral discre-
tion they possessed in shaping the law, 194 could-and did-distance them-
selves from design patents, and by extension, design, thereby confirming195 
their own normatively desirable identityl96 and helping to avoid (real or imag-
ined) scrutiny in an era of growing suspicion about the sexuality of-poten-
tially-any man. 197 
Leading decisions in turn-of-the-century design-patent cases reveal that 
the sociocultural dynamics described above played a significant role in judicial 
thinking and behavior. While not the only (or even the most direct or effective) 
means of "performing" prevailing gender and sexuality norms, opinions issued 
in design-patent disputes issued by leading federal judges between roughly 
aspects of civilization-inclnding, most notably for present pnrposes, "some form of permanent 
association between the sexes," as part of the inherent order of societies rather than culturally 
contingent. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40, 41 (1918) CThe 
jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naIve state of mind that accepts what 
has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by 
all men everywhere. No doubt it is true that, so far as we can see ahead, some arrangements and 
the rudiments of familiar institutions seem to be necessary elements in any society that may spring 
from our own and that would seem to us to be civilized [including] some form of permanent asso-
ciation between the sexes.") (emphasis added.) Notably, a commentator praising Holmes' article 
the following year linked the Justice's view to the "philosophy of revolution based upon the bio-
logical law of Natural Selection." Boyd E. Boyd, Justice Holmes on Natural Law and the Moral 
Ideal, 29 INT'L J. ETIDCS 397, 397 (1919). Accord RUSSETT, supra note 29 (on Victorian use of 
"scientism"). 
194. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (shaping Commerce Clause doctrine 
based in part on the purported moral damage inflicted by gambling); Rosen v. United States, 161 
U.S. 29 (1896) (reflecting outcome consistent with majority's hostility toward "obscene" mate-
rial); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (giving effect to Court's strong 
religious impulses, in contravention of plain language of statute in question). 
195. See Robbins, supra note 158, at 141-42 CHow does a man write in such a way as to 
ensure that his audience is in no doubt about his 'manliness'? There is no precise formula, but the 
choices of form and matter, the how and the what in writing, and the context in which the writing 
takes place, provide some clues. They must be chosen in order to reflect the expected virtues of 
masculinity, now [as ofthejin de siecle] being defined not as adult qualities, but in opposition to 
femininity."). 
196. See KUCHTA, supra note 96, at 7 CManners and material culture gave shape to ideo-
logical processes; material signs formed and informed systems of power, rather than standing 
outside them in some exterior symbolic realm .... Thus while ideas of masculine character were 
constructed by changing political ideologies, political ideologies in turn were constructed around 
changing notions of character."). 
197. As historian George Chauncey recounts: "A sympathetic and unusually well informed 
doctor writing in 1918 confirmed the validity of such concerns, noting that in respectable society, 
'the accusation of perversity [homosexuality] ... means min.'" CHAUNCEY, supra note 119, at 
385 n.29 (quoting E.S. Shepherd, Contribution to the Study of Intermediacy, 14 AM. J. UROLOGY 
& SEXOLOGY 242 (1918)). This stigma certainly applied long before 1918, as illustrated by 
numerous primary sources collected by Chauncey. See id. at 44. Whether the nature of such "ruin" 
was legal (as in the case of Oscar Wilde) or merely "social" mattered little, for the result was the 
same: loss of status and power in mainstream society. Those deemed homosexual effectively 
"forfeit[ed] their privileged status as men." Id. at 58, 59. Further, being married did not shield one 
from scrutiny; Oscar Wilde himself was widely known married and even fathered multiple 
children, as did many homosexuals of the era. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 94-96. 
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1870 and 1930 made increasing use of symbolic,198 allegorical,199lexical,20o 
and other techniques to visibly endorse201 the values of the politically domi-
nant segments of American society. Judges could thereby-whether con-
sciously or not202-contribute to a desirable construction of others' perceptions 
of them203 and simultaneously rule in a manner that would ostensibly promote 
a specific vision of "public order,,,204 the "public interest,,,205 and "the good of 
the community.,,206 
In Part 2 of this series,207 I will engage in a close reading of influential ju-
dicial decisions on issues of critical importance to design-patent law-particu-
larly, in appeals decided by the judges of the Second Circuit, who sat in the 
American design capital of New York City, and whose rhetoric and manipula-
tion of design-patent doctrine strongly influenced the direction of the law in 
other circuit courts when they eventually came to rule on the same or similar 
issues. As my examination will reveal, these judges implemented social norms 
concerning design, along with judicial concerns about personal and institu-
tionallegitimacy, in a manner that strongly influenced both doctrine and out-
comes, and gradually eliminated design patents as a viable tool for advancing 
claims of intellectual property infringement. 
198. JERRY D. MOORE, VISIONS OF CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
THEORIES AND THEORISTS 285 (4th ed. 2012) nClulture is symbolic aud meauingful, symbolic 
systems provide guidelines for action, and the action is often directed to central contradictions of 
social life .... Rituals are a class of symbolic systems."). 
199. See GARY WATT, DRESS, LAW, AND NAKED TRUTH: A CULTURAL STUDY OF FASHION 
AND FORM 5 (2013) nWlithin civil society, dress and adormnent mediate between the bare hu-
man individual and the social group in a way that parallels law's function as a mediator between 
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